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ABSTRACT
The widespread use of smartphones in our everyday life gives rise to pri-
vacy concerns. Fingerprinting smartphones can jeopardize user privacy by
enabling remote identification of users without users’ awareness. In this
dissertation we study the feasibility of using onboard sensors such as micro-
phones, accelerometers and gyroscopes to fingerprint smartphones. During
fabrication, subtle imperfections arise in device sensors which induce distinc-
tive anomalies in the generated signal. Using machine learning techniques
we can distinguish smartphones generating such distinctive anomalies.
We first look at fingerprinting smartphones through onboard microphones
and speakers. We explore different acoustic features and analyze their ability
to successfully fingerprint smartphones. Our study identifies the prominent
acoustic features capable of fingerprinting smartphones with a high success
rate, and also examines the impact of background noise and other variables on
fingerprinting accuracy. Next, we surreptitiously fingerprint smartphones us-
ing the imperfections of motion sensors (i.e., accelerometers and gyroscopes)
embedded in modern smartphones, through a web page. We analyze how
well motion sensor fingerprinting works under real-world constraints by col-
lecting data from a large number of smartphones under both lab and public
environments. Our study demonstrates that motion sensor fingerprinting is
effective even with 500 users. We also develop a model to estimate predic-
tion accuracy for larger user populations; our model provides a conservative
estimate of at least 10% classification accuracy with 100 000 users, which
suggests that motion sensor fingerprinting can be effective when combined
with even a weak browser fingerprint. We then investigate the use of motion
sensors on the web and find, distressingly, that many sites send motion sensor
data to servers for storage and analysis, paving the way for potential finger-
printing. Finally, we consider the problem of developing countermeasures for
motion sensor fingerprinting; we propose several practical countermeasures
ii
and evaluate their usability through a large-scale user study. We find that
countermeasures such as data obfuscation and sensor quantization are really
promising in the sense that they not only drastically reduce fingerprinting
accuracy but also remain benign to applications using motion sensors.
iii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The world is more connected than ever before and smartphones are making
it easy for users to stay connected to the world around them. According to
new figures from eMarketer the number of smartphone users worldwide will
surpass 2 billion in 2016 [1]. The rapid uptake of intelligent smartphones is
not surprising, due to the numerous advantages they provide to consumers,
from entertainment and social applications to business and advanced com-
puting capabilities. As a result smartphones have unprecedented access to
sensitive personal information, and impose threatening concerns for user pri-
vacy [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7].
1.1 Motivation
Smartphones have made it easy for users to access online services and in-
formation from anywhere at anytime. However, such seamless connectivity
with the web has made it lucrative for advertisers to track users’ activities
at different websites. Traditionally, advertisers implant cookies to build con-
sumer profiles on users by tracking a user’s surfing history without informing
the user. Such privacy-invasive tracking raised concerns in the way cookies
were being used and as a result legislation was passed to make changes to
the rules on using cookies [8]. This prompted browser developers to provide
ways to clear cookies, and also provide options to browse in private modes
which do not store long-term cookies. Moreover, around 2010 the “Do Not
Track” policy was proposed, which enabled users to opt out of tracking by
websites they do not visit, including analytics services, advertising networks,
and social platforms [9]. However, even though major online advertising
trade groups initially pledged to support “Do Not Track” that promise still
remains unfulfilled. And even with “Do Not Track” enabled most websites
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in the wild were found to not honor the user’s preference [10]. So after the
failure of the “Do Not Track” proposal, users have increasingly started using
tools such as ad- and tracker-blocking extensions, as well as private browsing
modes, to protect their privacy.
In turn, advertisers have started fingerprinting user devices through the
browser [11] to track users across the web without the use of cookies. A
device fingerprint is a set of system attributes that, with high likelihood,
uniquely characterizes a device. These attributes generally include, for ex-
ample, the device’s screen size, the versions of installed softwares, and the
list of installed fonts. Attributes that are more diverse and stable (e.g., the
list of fonts) facilitate better identification compared to those that are more
common or unpredictable. Such stateless user tracking allows advertising
companies to overcome the restrictions imposed by regulation on cookies.
Thus, browser-based fingerprinting raises serious privacy concerns for every-
day users because its stateless nature makes it hard to detect and even harder
to opt-out. Moreover, this fingerprinting technique works just as well in the
private browsing mode. To make things worse, in recent years researchers
have come up with a more advanced technique that uses HTML5 canvas ele-
ments to fingerprint the fonts and rendering engines used by the browser [12].
Many studies have shown that all of these techniques are actually used in
the wild [13, 10, 14].
With the advent of smartphones the battle for user privacy is shifting to-
wards mobile platforms, which are quickly becoming the dominant mode for
web browsing [15, 16, 17, 18]. Although existing fingerprinting techniques
become less effective on mobile platforms due to constrained hardware and
software environment [19, 20]; modern smartphones open door to new threats
as they are equipped with a wide variety of sensors such as microphones, ac-
celerometers and gyroscopes all of which are accessible to applications and
websites for a variety of novel uses. These sensors can be exploited to threaten
user privacy by enabling sensor fingerprinting. During manufacturing, im-
perfections are introduced in the analog circuitry of these sensors, and as
such, two sensors never produce the same signal. This dissertation conveys
the following statement–
“It is feasible to fingerprint smartphones by exploiting the manufacturing im-
perfections of onboard sensors. There are also ways to mitigate some of these
sensor fingerprinting techniques.”
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1.2 Contributions
In this dissertation, we study how acoustic hardware such as microphones and
speakers, and motion sensors such as accelerometers and gyroscopes can to
utilized to fingerprint smartphones under realistic settings. First, we look at
how these sensors can be exploited as side-channels to enable an advertiser to
fingerprint smartphones. Second, we focus on deriving countermeasures for
motion sensor fingerprinting as accessing these sensors require no explicit user
permission, whereas accessing microphone requires explicit user permission.
Next, we perform real world web scanning to see how websites are accessing
motion sensors. Lastly, through user study we look at how our proposed
countermeasures impact the utility of the motion sensors.
This dissertation makes the following major contributions:
• Fingerprinting Onboard Sensors in Smartphones: We explore
ways to fingerprint smartphones through embedded sensors. We look
at acoustic sensors like microphones (and speakers), and also investigate
motion sensors like accelerometers and gyroscopes.
– Fingerprinting Acoustic Hardware: We exploit hardware-
level imperfections in speakers and microphones to uniquely dis-
tinguish smartphones. Manufacturing process introduces subtle
imperfections into the analog circuitry of these components, and
as such the audio streams produced by two speakers or received
by two microphones are never alike. Through an observational
study, we find that these imperfections are substantial and preva-
lent enough that we can reliably fingerprint devices by conducting
spectral analysis on recorded audio streams. We also identify the
most dominant acoustic features capable of distinguishing devices
with high accuracy.
– Fingerprinting Motion Sensors: We investigate the feasibility
of fingerprinting motion sensors such as accelerometers and gyro-
scopes in smartphones. These motion sensors are used by many
applications such as health monitoring and interactive gaming.
However, by measuring the anomalies in the signal generated by
these motion sensors it is possible to uniquely track smartphones.
Distressingly, such measurements can be conducted surreptitiously
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in the browser as they do not require explicit user permission and
can thus be used to track users across applications and websites.
We find that simultaneous use of both accelerometer and gyro-
scope produces a more accurate fingerprint for the device than us-
ing only the accelerometer or gyroscope. We also show that the use
of inaudible sound, played through the smartphone speaker, stim-
ulates the onboard gyroscope uniquely and thus improves finger-
printing accuracy. To verify whether our fingerprinting technique
holds for a large number of devices, we perform a large-scale user
study to demonstrate that motion sensor fingerprinting is effective
even with 500 users. We also develop a model to estimate predic-
tion accuracy for larger user populations; our model provides a
conservative estimate of at least 10% classification accuracy with
100 000 devices.
• Mitigating Sensor Fingerprinting: We next explore ways to coun-
teract sensor fingerprinting and study their implication on the utility
of the sensors.
– Possible Mitigation Techniques: We look at how to mitigate
fingerprinting of sensors like accelerometers and gyroscopes that
are deemed non-sensitive (i.e., accessing them does not require
explicit user permission). We investigate three different counter-
measure techniques. First, we consider the use of calibration to
eliminate some of the error that results from manufacturing im-
perfections. Promisingly, we find that calibrating the accelerome-
ter is easy and has a significant impact on classification accuracy.
Gyroscope calibration, however, is more challenging without spe-
cialized equipment, and attempts to calibrate the gyroscope by
hand do not result in an effective countermeasure. Second, we
introduce an alternative countermeasure called obfuscation, which
introduces additional noise to the sensor readings in the hopes of
hiding the natural errors. Obfuscation has the advantage of not
requiring a calibration step; we find that by adding noise that is
similar in magnitude to the natural errors that result from man-
ufacturing imperfections, we can reduce the accuracy of finger-
printing more effectively than by calibration. We also investigate
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a few variations of obfuscation where we explore adding noise in
a differential privacy preserving manner (inspired by Differential
Privacy), as well as adding white Gaussian noise to obfuscate fre-
quency domain features. Lastly, we look at quantization where we
lower the resolution of the sensor by mapping their values to fixed
bins. The basic idea behind quantization is that human brain
cannot discriminate minute changes in angle and/or magnitude,
and as a result if the raw values from a sensor are altered slightly,
this should not adversely impact the functionality of the sensor.
We find that quantization also drastically reduces fingerprinting
accuracy.
– Analyzing Utility of Sensors: Finally, we look at how our
countermeasure techniques impact the utility of the underlying
sensors. To evaluate this we first identify how motion sensors are
being used in the wild. With this in mind we analyze the static and
dynamic JavaScripts used by the top 100 000 Alexa websites [21].
We discover several common applications of motion sensors such
as orientation and gesture detection. But distressingly, we find
that a large fraction of scripts send motion data back to a server.
Thus, although we have not been able to identify cases of motion
sensor fingerprinting in the wild, the infrastructure for collecting
and analyzing this data is already present in some cases. After
identifying the most common applications, we evaluate the impact
of our countermeasures for a step-counter and a tilt-based video
game. These two applications are user-centric and thus provide us
with both subjective and objective measures. We find that data
obfuscation and sensor quantization do not adversely affect the
utility of the motion sensors.
1.3 Dissertation Outline
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides background
on the internal architecture of these hardware and highlights the most likely
source of idiosyncrasies for these hardware. We also provide an elaborate
description of various related works on fingerprinting devices.
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Next, we describe how we used audio streams generated and/or received
by smartphones to uniquely distinguish smartphones in Chapter 3. We start
off by describing the experimental framework for capturing the unique char-
acteristics of the onboard microphone and speaker. We then describe our
acoustic feature extraction process and look at how different features con-
tribute to generating a unique device fingerprint. Lastly, we look at how well
we can fingerprint smartphones through microphones and speakers, both
separately and collectively. We also investigate how different environmental
factors impact the stability of our fingerprints.
Chapter 4 describes how onboard motion sensors can be exploited to track
smartphones through the web browser. We first describe our data collection
setup where we develop our own web page to collect motion sensor data.
We then discuss the features that we used to generate the device finger-
print, along with the machine learning tools that we use for matching the
fingerprints. Next, we evaluate how well we can fingerprint smartphones in
both lab setting and public setting. Finally, we perform sensitivity analysis
to determine how stable our fingerprints are under different environmental
conditions.
Having shown that it is feasible to fingerprint motion sensors embedded in
smartphones through a web page, we extend our experiment for a large-scale
analysis in Chapter 5. Through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk we were able to
collect data from more than 500 devices and we study how our fingerprinting
approach scales for this range of devices. We also generate parametric intra-
and inter-cluster distance distributions from this large dataset. We utilize
state-of-the-art distance metric learning algorithms to optimize our intra-
and inter-cluster distances for a k-NN classifier. Such distance distributions
enable us to emulate distance-based classifiers like k-NN to estimate how well
our fingerprinting approach performs with 100 000 devices.
In Chapter 6 we perform a real world measurement study to determine
how many of the top websites access motion sensors from smartphones. Our
measurement study reveals that about 1% of the top 100 000 websites access
motion sensors. We then broadly determine the use cases for accessing motion
sensors. We find that there are broadly 8 different use cases for accessing
motion sensor data, but disturbingly, majority of the websites send motion
sensor data to third party sites for storage or analysis.
We discuss and explore the effectiveness of several countermeasures against
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motion sensor fingerprinting in Chapter 7. All of our proposed countermea-
sures significantly thwart device fingerprinting accuracy. However, some of
our countermeasures also adversely affect the utility of motion sensors. We,
therefore, study and determine the countermeasures that have minimal im-
pact on the utility of the underlying motion sensors. We perform a large-scale
user study to show that our proposed countermeasures can be readily adopted
by web browsers to better protect user privacy.
Lastly, we summarize all our findings and provide our final statement in
Chapter 8.
1.4 Collaborators and Published Works
Most of our work has been peer-reviewed and published in top tier security
conferences. In this context we would like to acknowledge our collaborators
– Edward Chou for his help in designing user-studies and Muhammad Haris
Mughees for his help in collecting JavaScripts accessing motion sensors in the
wild. Following are the conference publications and technical reports related
to the different chapters in this dissertation.
• Fingerprinting smartphones using acoustic components:
– A. Das, N. Borisov, and M. Caesar, “Fingerprinting Smart De-
vices Through Embedded Acoustic Components,” CoRR, vol.
abs/1403.3366, 2014. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/
1403.3366
– A. Das, N. Borisov, and M. Caesar, “Do You Hear What I Hear?:
Fingerprinting Smart Devices Through Embedded Acoustic Com-
ponents,” in Proceedings of the 21st ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 2014, pp. 441–
452
• Fingerprinting smartphones using motion sensors:
– A. Das, N. Borisov, and M. Caesar, “Exploring Ways To
Mitigate Sensor-Based Smartphone Fingerprinting,” CoRR, vol.
abs/1503.01874, 2015. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/
1503.01874
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– A. Das, N. Borisov, and M. Caesar, “Tracking Mobile Web Users
Through Motion Sensors: Attacks and Defenses,” in Proceedings
of the 23rd Annual Network and Distributed System Security Sym-
posium (NDSS). Internet Society, 2016
• Fingerprinting smartphones at large-scale and analyzing mo-
tion sensor access patterns in the web:
– A. Das, N. Borisov, E. Chou, and M. H. Mughees, “Smart-
phone Fingerprinting Via Motion Sensors: Analyzing Feasibility
at Large-Scale and Studying Real Usage Patterns,” CoRR, vol.
abs/1605.08763, 2016. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/
1605.08763
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this chapter we take a closer look at some of the onboard hardware such
as microphone, speaker, accelerometer and gyroscope. This will provide us
with an understanding of how these hardware components can be used to
uniquely fingerprint smartphones. We also discuss some of the most recent
and well-known studies regarding device fingerprinting.
2.1 Acoustic Hardware
Microphone and speaker are the most common acoustic hardware available
on any type of smartphone. They provide the fundamental functionality
of a phone, which is placing and receiving phone calls. So we first take a
closer look at their internal architecture to identify the potential source of
imperfections that make them distinguishable.
2.1.1 Microphone
Microphones in modern smartphones are based on Micro-Electro-Mechanical
Systems (MEMS) [27, 28, 29]. To enhance active noise and echo canceling ca-
pabilities, most smartphones today have more than one MEMS microphone.
For example, the iPhone 5 has a total of three embedded MEMS micro-
phones [28]. According to the IHS-iSuppli report, Apple and Samsung were
the top consumers of MEMS microphones in 2012, accounting for a combined
54% of all shipped MEMS microphones [27].
A MEMS microphone, sometimes called a microphone chip or silicon micro-
phone, consists of a coil-less pressure-sensitive diaphragm directly etched into
a silicon chip. It comprises of a MEMS die and a complementary metal-oxide-
semiconductor (CM-OS) die combined in an acoustic housing [30, 31]. The
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CMOS often includes both a preamplifier and an analog-to-digital (AD) con-
verter. Modern fabrication techniques enable highly compact deigns, making
them well suited for integration in digital mobile devices. The internal archi-
tecture of a MEMS microphone is shown on Figure 2.1. From the figure we
can see that the MEMS microphone’s physical design is based on a variable
capacitor consisting of a highly flexible diaphragm in close proximity to a
perforated, rigid back-plate. The perforations permit the air between the
diaphragm and back-plate to escape. When an acoustic signal reaches the
diaphragm through the acoustic holes, the diaphragm is set in motion. This
mechanical deformation causes capacitive change which in turn causes volt-
age change. In this way sound pressure is converted into an electrical signal
for further processing. The back-chamber acts as an acoustic resonator and
the ventilation hole allows the air compressed inside the back chamber to
flow out, allowing the diaphragm to move back into its original place.
⇓
Sound Wave
Distance
Variable Capacitance
Flexible Diaphragm
Perforated rigid back−plate
Acoustic holes
Electrode
Ventilation hole
Back−chamber
Movable diaphragm
Compressed Air
Figure 2.1: The internal architecture of a MEMS microphone chip used in
modern smartphones.
The sensitivity of the microphone depends on how well the diaphragm
deflects to acoustic pressure; it also depends on the gap between the static
back-plate and the flexible diaphragm. Unfortunately, even though the man-
ufacturing process for these microphones has been streamlined, no two chips
roll off the assembly line functioning in exactly the same way. Imperfec-
tions can arise for the following reasons: slight variations in the chemical
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composition of components from one batch to the next, wear in the manu-
facturing machines or changes in temperature and humidity. While subtle
imperfections in the microphone chips may go unnoticed by human ears,
computationally such discrepancies may be sufficient to discriminate them,
as we later show.
2.1.2 Microspeaker
A microspeaker is a scaled down version of a basic acoustic speaker. So
let us first look at how speakers work before we discuss how microspeakers
can be used to generate unique fingerprints. Figure 2.2(a) shows the basic
components of a speaker. The diaphragm is usually made of paper, plastic
or metal and its edges are connected to the suspension which is a rim of
flexible material that allows the diaphragm to move. The narrow end of the
diaphragm’s cone is connected to the voice coil. Voice coil is attached to the
basket by a spider (damper), which holds the coil in position, but allows it
to move freely back and forth. A permanent magnet is positioned directly
below the voice coil.
Permanent Magnet
Diaphragm
Spider
Basket
Back−plate
Suspension
Voice coil
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2.2: (a) The basic components of a speaker, (b) A typical MEMS
microspeaker, (c) The internal architecture of a microspeaker chip.
11
Sound waves are produced whenever electrical current flows through the
voice coil, which acts as an electromagnet. Running varying electrical cur-
rent through the voice coil induces a varying magnetic field around the coil,
altering the magnetization of the metal it is wrapped around. When the
electromagnet’s polar orientation switches, so does the direction of repulsion
and attraction. In this way, the magnetic force between the voice coil and
the permanent magnet causes the voice coil to vibrate, which in turn vibrates
the speaker diaphragm to generate sound waves.
Figure 2.2(b) shows a typical MEMS microspeaker chip and Figure 2.2(c)
shows the components inside the microspeaker [32]. The components are
similar to that of a basic speaker; the only difference is the size and fabri-
cation process [33, 34, 35]. The amplitude and frequency of the sound wave
produced by the speaker’s diaphragm is dictated respectively by the distance
and rate at which the voice coil moves. Each speaker component can intro-
duce variations into the generated sound. For example, variations in the
electromagnetic properties of the driver can cause differences in the rate and
smoothness at which the diaphragm moves. Therefore, due to the inevitable
variations and imperfections of the manufacturing process, no two speakers
are going to be alike, resulting in subtle differences in their produced sound.
In our work, we develop techniques to computationally localize and evaluate
these differences.
2.2 Motion Sensors
Motion sensing is transforming how users interact with smartphones and as
a result motion sensing has become a “must have” feature for all major op-
erating systems and hardware platform providers. Motion sensors enable a
rich user-interactive experience in the form of gesture recognition, activity
recognition and tracking. These capabilities enable sophisticated applications
such as immersive gaming, augmented reality, fitness/health monitoring and
accurate navigation, all of which are providing new ways to generate revenue
for carriers and manufacturers. Accelerometer and gyroscope are the most
common motion sensors available on smartphones. Accelerometer and gyro-
scope sensors in modern smartphones are based on Micro-Electro-Mechanical
Systems (MEMS). STMicroelectronics [36] and InvenSense [37] are among
12
the top vendors supplying MEMS-based accelerometer and gyroscope sensor
to different smartphone manufacturers [38]. Traditionally, Apple [39, 40]1
and Samsung [42, 43] favor using STMicroelectronics motion sensors, while
Google [44, 45] tends to use InvenSense sensors.
2.2.1 Accelerometer
Accelerometer is a device that measures proper acceleration. Proper accel-
eration is different from coordinate acceleration (linear acceleration) as it
measures the g-force. For example, an accelerometer at rest on a surface
will measure an acceleration of g = 9.81ms−2 straight upwards, while for a
free falling object it will measure an acceleration of zero. MEMS-based ac-
celerometers are based on differential capacitance [46]. Figure 2.3 shows the
internal architecture of a MEMS-based accelerometer. As we can see there
are several pairs of fixed electrodes and a movable seismic mass. Under zero
force the distances d1 and d2 are equal, and as a result the two generated ca-
pacitance are equal, but a change in force will cause the movable seismic mass
to shift closer to one of the fixed electrodes (i.e., d1 6= d2) causing a change
in the generated capacitance. This difference in capacitance is detected and
amplified to produce a voltage proportional to the acceleration. The slightest
gap difference between the structural electrodes, introduced during the man-
ufacturing process, can cause a change in the generated capacitance. Also,
the flexibility of the seismic mass can be slightly different from one chip to an-
other. These form of minute imprecisions in the electro-mechanical structure
induce subtle imperfections in accelerometer chips.
2.2.2 Gyroscope
Gyroscope measures the rate of rotation (in rads−1) along the device’s three
axes. MEMS-based gyroscopes use the Coriolis effect to measure the angular
rate. Whenever an angular velocity of ωˆ is exerted on a moving mass of
weight m, and velocity vˆ, the object experiences a Coriolis force in a direction
perpendicular to the rotation axis and to the velocity of the moving object
(as shown in figure 2.4). The Coriolis force is calculated by the following
1iPhone 6 has been reported to use sensors made by InvenSense [41]
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Seismic Mass
Movable
Anchor
Fixed Electrode
1d d2
Figure 2.3: Internal architecture of a MEMS accelerometer. Differential
capacitance is proportional to the applied acceleration.
equation, Fˆ = −2mωˆ × vˆ. Generally, the angular rate (ωˆ) is measured by
sensing the magnitude of the Coriolis force exerted on a vibrating proof-mass
within the gyro [47, 48]. The Coriolis force is sensed by a capacitive sensing
structure where a change in the vibration of the proof-mass causes a change
in capacitance which is then converted into a voltage signal by the internal
circuitry. Again the slightest imperfection in the electro-mechanical structure
will introduce idiosyncrasies across chips.
m
Y
X
Z
ω
v
F         = −2m    * vCoriolis ω
Figure 2.4: MEMS-based gyros use Coriolis force to compute angular
velocity. The Coriolis force induces change in capacitance which is
proportional to the angular velocity.
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2.3 Related Work
Human fingerprints, due to their unique nature, are a very popular tool used
to identify people in forensic and biometric applications [49, 50]. Researchers
have long sought to find an equivalent of fingerprint in computer systems
by finding characteristics that can help identify an individual device. Such
fingerprints exploit variations in both the hardware and software of devices
to aid in identification.
As early as 1960, the US government used unique transmission charac-
teristics to track mobile transmitters [51]. Later, with the introduction of
cellular network researchers were able to successfully distinguish transmit-
ters by analyzing the spectral characteristics of the transmitted radio sig-
nal [52]. Researchers have suggested using radio-frequency fingerprints to
enhance wireless authentication [53, 54], as well as localization [55]. Others
have leveraged the minute manufacturing imperfections in network interface
cards (NICs) by analyzing the radio-frequency of the emitted signals [56, 57].
Computer clocks have also been used for fingerprinting: Moon et al. showed
that network devices tend to have a unique and constant clock skews [58];
Kohno et al. exploited this to distinguish network devices through TCP and
ICMP timestamps [59].
Software can also serve as a distinguishing feature, as different devices
have a different installed software base. Researchers have long been exploit-
ing the difference in the protocol stack installed on IEEE 802.11 compliant
devices. Desmond et al. [60] have looked at distinguishing unique devices
over Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) simply by performing timing
analysis on the 802.11 probe request packets. Others have investigated sub-
tle differences in the firmware and device drivers running on IEEE 802.11
compliant devices [61]. 802.11 MAC headers have also been used to uniquely
track devices [62]. Moreover, there are well-known open source toolkits like
Nmap [63] and Xprobe [64] that can remotely fingerprint an operating system
by analyzing unique response from the TCP/IP networking stack.
2.3.1 Browser Fingerprinting
A common application of fingerprinting is to track a user across multiple visits
to a website, or a collection of sites. Traditionally, this was done with the aid
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of cookies explicitly stored by the browser. However, privacy concerns have
prompted web browsers to implement features that clear the cookie store,
as well as provide private browsing modes that do not store cookies long-
term. This has prompted site operators to develop other means of uniquely
identifying and tracking users. Eckersley’s Panopticon project showed that
many browsers can be uniquely identified by enumerating installed fonts and
other browser characteristics that are easily accessible via JavaScript [11].
A more advanced technique uses HTML5 canvas elements to fingerprint the
fonts and rendering engines used by the browser [12]. Others have proposed
the use of performance benchmarks for differentiating between JavaScript
engines [65]. Lastly, browsing history can to used to profile and track online
users [66]. Numerous studies have found evidence of these and other tech-
niques being used in the wild [10, 14, 13]. A number of countermeasures to
these techniques exist; typically they disable or restrict the ability of a web-
site to probe the characteristics of a web browser. Nikiforakis et al. propose
using random noise to make fingerprints non-deterministic which essentially
breaks linkability across multiple visits [67].
With the rapid growth of smart devices, researchers are now focusing on
adopting existing fingerprinting techniques in the context of smartphones.
Like cookies, app developers have looked at using device IDs such as Unique
Device Identifier (UDID) or International Mobile Station Equipment Identity
(IMEI) to track users across multiple applications. However, Apple ceased
the use of UDID since iOS 6 [68] and for Android accessing IMEI requires ex-
plicit user permission [69]. Moreover, due to constrained hardware and soft-
ware environment existing methods often lack in precision for smartphones,
and recent studies have shown this to be true [19, 20]. However, this year
Laperdrix et al. have shown that it is in fact possible to fingerprint smart-
phones effectively through user-agent string which is becoming richer every
day due to the numerous vendors with their different firmware updates [70].
Others have looked at fingerprinting smartphones by exploiting the personal
configuration settings which are often accessible to third party apps [71].
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2.3.2 Microphone and Speaker Fingerprinting
Our work is inspired by hardware-based fingerprinting techniques. We, firstly,
focus on fingerprinting onboard speakers and microphones, and in this con-
text the following works are closely related to ours.
Clarkson’s work [72] showed that it is possible to distinguish loudspeak-
ers by analyzing recorded audio samples emitting from them. However, his
experiments used special audio clips that contained 65 different frequencies,
whereas we are using common audio excerpts like ringtones. Moreover, his
experiments ignored the subtlety introduced by microphones. In fact in one
experiment, though statistically not meaningful as it tested only two similar
microphones, they found no variation across microphones. We, on the other
hand found that microphones can vary across different units. Finally, his
study did not thoroughly analyze the different acoustic features that can be
used to successfully carry out device fingerprinting. As a result, he was able
to achieve only 81% accuracy in distinguishing heterogeneous loudspeakers.
Bojinov et al. [73] were investigating the feasibility of fingerprinting smart-
phones through both speakers and microphones around the same time. They
were looking at the intensity ratio of the transmitted and received audio sig-
nal at 13 different frequencies. However, our experimental setup differs from
them in several ways. Firstly, they experimented with only 16 devices all of
the same make and model whereas we experimented with 52 devices from five
different manufacturers. So, we test our approach for not only same make
and model devices but also different make and model devices. Secondly,
we look at fingerprinting the speaker and microphone individually as well as
combining both of them. Lastly, we study the impact of ambient background
noise on fingerprinting accuracy.
Contemporary to our work, Zhou et al. [74] have also looked at finger-
printing smartphones through speakers. They used high frequency inaudible
sound to minimize the impact of background noise; while this is generally
true, there are everyday environments like metro station that exhibit high
frequency white noise. One point to note is that in the case of recording
audio through the phone’s built-in microphone they are actually fingerprint-
ing both the speaker and microphone and not just the speaker. Also, their
experiments were conducted using 50 OEM (Original Equipment Manufac-
turer) speaker chips on a single Samsung Galaxy S3. However, the internal
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packaging of the different components inside the phone along with the sur-
face on which the phone is kept impacts the produced audio signal [73]. So,
compared to our work their experimental setup is less realistic because we
use individual smartphones instead of individual speaker chips. Finally, their
study only looks at speakers of the same make and model whereas we test
our approach for both same and different make and model devices.
On a different note audio fingerprinting has a rich history of notable re-
search [75]. There are studies that have looked at classifying audio excerpts
based on their content [76, 77]. Others have looked at distinguishing human
speakers from audio segments [78, 79]. There has also been work on explor-
ing various acoustic features for audio classification [80]. One of the more
popular applications of audio fingerprinting has been genre and artist recog-
nition [81, 82]. Our work takes advantage of the large set of acoustic features
that have been explored by existing work in audio fingerprinting. However,
instead of classifying the content of audio segments, we utilize acoustics fea-
tures to capture the manufacturing imperfections of microphones and speak-
ers embedded in smartphones.
2.3.3 Motion Sensor Fingerprinting
While it is possible to fingerprint smartphones through microphones and
speakers, such techniques require access to the microphone, which is typically
controlled with a separate permission due to the obvious privacy concerns
with the ability to capture audio. On the other hand accessing motion sensors
is considered not sensitive and as such no explicit user permission is required
to access them. We, therefore, also focus on fingerprinting smartphones
surreptitiously through accelerometers and gyroscopes. The following studies
closely resemble our work in this dissertation.
Bojinov et al. [73] consider using accelerometers to fingerprint smart-
phones. Their techniques, however, rely on having the user perform a cali-
bration of the accelerometer, the parameters of which are used to distinguish
phones. Dey et al. [83] apply machine learning techniques to create an ac-
celerometer fingerprint, but they require the vibration motor to be active to
stimulate the accelerometer sensor; in the absence of external stimulation,
they report an average precision and recall of around 87% for 25 station-
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ary phones. In contrast, our work studies phones that are in a natural
web-browsing setting, either in a user’s hand or resting on a flat surface.
Additionally, we consider the simultaneous use of both accelerometer and
gyroscope to produce a more accurate fingerprint. Inspired by prior work
that uses the gyroscope to recover audio signals [84], we also stimulate the
gyroscope with an inaudible tone. Moreover, our work provides a real world
perspective on the problem. We not only show that sensor-based fingerprint-
ing works at large-scale but also show how websites are accessing the sensor
data in the wild. Finally, we propose and evaluate several countermeasures
to reduce fingerprinting accuracy without entirely blocking access to the mo-
tion sensors. To analyze the impact of our countermeasures we perform a
large-scale user study where users play an online game to show that our
countermeasures do not affect the utility of the motion sensors. Table 2.1
highlights some comparisons with related works.
Table 2.1: Comparison with other motion sensor fingerprinting studies.
Work Sensors
a
Setting Stimulation
Features Features # of
Result
b
Explored Used Devices
[83] A Lab Vibration 80 36 107c 99% Acc
[83] A Lab None 80 36 25 87% Fs
[73] A Lab Flip phone 2 2 33 100% Acc
[73] A Public Flip phone 2 2 3583d 15% Acc
Ours A,G Lab None 100 70 30 99% Fs
Ours A,G Public None 100 70 471e 86% Fs
Ours A,G Lab+Public None 100 70 501 86% Fs
Ours A,G Lab In hand 100 70 30 93% Fs
Ours A,G Lab In hand+Audio 100 70 30 98% Fs
ahere ‘A’ means accelerometer and ‘G’ refers to gyroscope
bhere ‘Acc’ means Accuracy and ‘Fs’ refers to F-score
c80 external chips, 25 phones and 2 tablets
dconsidering only devices with two submissions
econsidering only devices with at least 5 training samples
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CHAPTER 3
FINGERPRINTING SMARTPHONES VIA
MICROPHONES AND SPEAKERS
All smartphones have acoustic components like microphone and speaker.
These are the very basic hardware available in any mobile phone. These
acoustic components are used for many purposes in today’s multimedia-
rich ecosystem starting from simple call making to interacting with games.
However, these acoustic hardware can be exploited to fingerprint smart-
phones. During fabrication, subtle imperfections arise in device microphone
and speaker which induce anomalies in the generated and received audio
signal. These anomalies can be utilized to generate unique fingerprints for
smartphones.
3.1 Overview
We start with an overview of our approach and present several viable at-
tack scenarios. The key observation behind our work is that imperfections
in smartphone hardware induce unique signatures on the received and trans-
mitted audio streams, and these unique signatures, if identified, can be used
by an adversary to fingerprint the device. We consider three fingerprinting
scenarios: speaker, microphone, and joint speaker-microphone fingerprint-
ing. In the first case, an attacker in a public environment, such as a cafe or
shopping mall, records audio generated by a smartphone speaker, such as a
ringtone (malicious app can also transmit inaudible sounds to remain unde-
tectable). The attacker can then use the recorded audio samples to track and
identify users as shown in Figure 3.1. Alternately, the attacker may obtain
audio recorded by a smartphone microphone and use that to identify the
user who made the recording as shown in Figure 3.2; this can have forensic
applications. A third way to track users is to convince them to install a
malicious application (e.g., a free online game), which can play and record
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audio clips using the device’s speaker and microphone. The app can then
stealthily upload the recorded audio clips to the attacker (e.g., piggybacking
it on log-in information or game state), who can then use the audio samples
to uniquely distinguish each user as shown in Figure 3.3. To do this, the ap-
plication would require access to both the speaker and microphone, as well as
network access, but such permissions are very common [85] and are unlikely
to raise alarm, especially given that a significant portion of the users cannot
comprehend the full consequences of smartphone permissions [86, 87, 88].
Figure 3.1: Fingerprinting smartphone speakers in public location.
Figure 3.2: Fingerprinting smartphone microphones in public location.
Figure 3.3: Fingerprinting both smartphone speakers and microphones.
3.2 Methodology
Our approach consists of two main tasks. The first task is acquiring a set of
audio samples for analysis in the first place. To do this, we have a listener
module, responsible for receiving and recording device audio. The listener
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module could be deployed as an application on the smartphone (many mobile
OSes allow direct access to microphone input), or as a stand-alone service
(e.g., the adversary has a microphone in a public setting like shopping mall
to pick up device audio). The next task is to effectively identify device signa-
tures from the received audio stream. To do this, we have an analyzer module,
which leverages signal processing techniques to localize spectral anomalies,
and constructs a ‘fingerprint’ of the auditory characteristics of the device. We
individually evaluate the feasibility of fingerprinting speakers, microphones
and a combination of both.
3.2.1 Procedure for Fingerprinting Speakers
An attacker can leverage our technique to passively observe audio signals
(e.g., ringtones or inaudible sound) emitted from device speakers in public
environments. To investigate this, we first look at fingerprinting speakers
integrated inside smartphones. For fingerprinting speakers we record audio
clips played from smartphones onto a laptop and we then extract acoustic
features from the recorded audio excerpts to generate fingerprints as shown
in Figure 3.4. We look at devices manufactured by both same vendor and
different vendors.
Figure 3.4: Steps for fingerprinting speakers.
3.2.2 Procedure for Fingerprinting Microphones
Attackers may also attempt to fingerprint devices by observing imperfec-
tions in device microphone, for example by convincing the user to install
an application on their phone, which can observe inputs from the device’s
microphone. To investigate the feasibility of this attack, we next look at
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fingerprinting microphones embedded in smartphones. To do this, we record
audio clips played from a laptop onto smartphones as shown in Figure 3.5.
Again we consider devices made by both same vendor and different vendors.
Figure 3.5: Steps for fingerprinting microphones.
3.2.3 Procedure for Fingerprinting both Speakers and
Microphones
An attacker may attempt to fingerprint devices by observing imperfections
in both device microphone and speaker, for example by convincing the user
to install a game on their phone which requires access to device speaker and
microphone to interact with the game (something like My Talking Tom [89]).
The attacker could potentially play a theme song at the start of the game
and at the same time make a recording of the audio clip. To investigate the
feasibility of this attack, we develop our own android app that plays and
records audio clips simultaneously and uploads the data to a remote server.
The recorded audio clips would then enable the attacker to characterize the
imperfections in microphones and speakers embedded inside smartphones.
Figure 3.6 summarizes the whole process.
Figure 3.6: Steps for fingerprinting both microphone and speaker.
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3.3 Experimental Setup
To perform our experiments, we constructed a small testbed environment
with real smartphone device hardware. In particular, our default environ-
ment consisted of a 266 square foot (14’x19’) office room, with nine-foot
dropped ceilings with polystyrene tile, comprising a graduate student office
in a University-owned building. The room was filled with desks and chairs,
and opens out to a public hall with footstep traffic. The room also receives a
minimal amount of ambient noise from air conditioning, desktop computers,
and florescent lighting. We placed smartphones in various locations in the
room. To emulate an attacker, we placed an ACER Aspire–5745 laptop in
the room. To investigate performance with inexpensive hardware, we used
the laptop’s built-in microphone to collect audio samples. We investigate
how varying this setup affects the performance of the attack in latter parts
of this chapter.
3.3.1 Device Types
We test our device fingerprinting approach on devices from five different
manufacturers. Table 3.1 highlights the models and quantities of the different
phones used in our experiments.
Table 3.1: Types of phones used for fingerprinting acoustic components.
Maker Model Quantity
Apple iPhone 5 1
HTC Nexus One 14
Samsung
Nexus S 8
Galaxy S3 3
Galaxy S4 10
Motorola Droid A855 15
Sony Ericsson W518 1
Total 52
3.3.2 Audio Genre Types
We also investigate different genres of audio excerpts. Table 3.2 describes the
different types of audio excerpts used in our experiments. Duration of the
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audio clips varies from 3 to 10 seconds. The default sampling frequency for all
audio excerpts is 44.1 kHz unless explicitly stated otherwise. All audio clips
are stored in WAV format [90] using 16-bit pulse-code-modulation (PCM)
technique.
Table 3.2: Types of audio excerpts used in our experiments.
Type Description Variations
Instrumental Musical instruments playing together, e.g., ringtone 4
Human speech Small segments of human speech 4
Song Combination of human voice & instrumental sound 3
3.3.3 Analytic Tools
For analysis, we leverage the following audio tools and analytic modules:
MIRtollbox [91], Netlab [92], Audacity [93] and Hertz [94]. Both MIRtoolbox
and Netlab are MATLAB modules providing a rich set of functions for an-
alyzing and extracting audio features. Audacity and Hertz are mainly used
for recording audio clip on laptop and smartphone, respectively.
3.4 Acoustic Features
Given our knowledge that imperfections exist in device audio hardware, we
now need some way to detect them. To do this, our approach identifies
acoustic features from an audio stream, and uses the features to construct a
fingerprint of the device. Computing acoustic features from an audio stream
has been a subject of much research [80, 75, 95, 76]. To gain an understanding
of how a broad range of acoustic features are affected by device imperfections
we investigate 15 different acoustic features (listed in Table 3.3), all of which
have been well-documented by researchers. A brief description of each acous-
tic feature follows.
Root-Mean-Square (RMS) Energy: This feature computes the square
root of the arithmetic mean of the squares of the original audio signal strength
at various frequencies. In the case of a set of N values {x1, x2, . . . , xN}, the
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Table 3.3: Explored acoustic features.
# Feature Dimension
1 RMS 1
2 ZCR 1
3 Low-Energy-Rate 1
4 Spectral Centroid 1
5 Spectral Entropy 1
6 Spectral Irregularity 1
7 Spectral Spread 1
8 Spectral Skewness 1
9 Spectral Kurtosis 1
10 Spectral Rolloff 1
11 Spectral Brightness 1
12 Spectral Flatness 1
13 MFCCs 13
14 Chromagram 12
15 Tonal Centroids 6
RMS value is given by the following formula:
xrms =
√
1
n
(x21 + x
2
2 + · · ·+ x2N) (3.1)
The RMS value provides an approximation of the average audio signal strength.
Zero Crossing Rate (ZCR): The zero-crossing rate is the rate at which
the signal changes sign from positive to negative or back [96]. This feature has
been used heavily in both speech recognition and music information retrieval,
for example to classify percussive sounds [97]. ZCR for a signal s of length
T can be defined as:
ZCR =
1
T
T∑
t=1
|s(t)− s(t− 1)| (3.2)
where s(t) = 1 if the signal has a positive amplitude at time t and 0 otherwise.
Zero-crossing rate provides a measure of the noisiness of the signal.
Low Energy Rate: The low energy rate computes the percentage of frames
(typically 50 ms chunks) with RMS power less than the average RMS power
for the whole audio signal. For instance, a musical excerpt with some very
loud frames and a lot of silent frames would have a high low-energy rate.
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Spectral Centroid: Spectral centroid represents the “center of mass” of
a spectral power distribution. It is calculated as the weighted mean of the
frequencies present in the signal, determined using a Fourier transform, with
their magnitudes as the weights:
Centroid, µ =
∑N
i=1 fi ·mi∑N
i=1mi
(3.3)
where mi represents the magnitude of bin number i, and fi represents the
center frequency of that bin.
Spectral Entropy: Spectral entropy captures the spikiness of a spectral
distribution. As a result spectral entropy can be used to capture the for-
mants or peaks in the sound envelope [98]. To compute spectral entropy, a
Digital Fourier Transform (DFT) of the signal is first carried out. Next, the
frequency spectrum is converted into a probability mass function (PMF) by
normalizing the spectrum using the following equation:
wi =
mi∑N
i=1mi
(3.4)
where mi represents the energy/magnitude of the i-th frequency component
of the spectrum, w = (w1, w2, . . . , wN) is the PMF of the spectrum and N
is the number of points in the spectrum. This PMF can then be used to
compute the spectral entropy using the following equation:
H =
N∑
i=1
wi · log2wi (3.5)
The central idea of using entropy as a feature is to capture the peaks of the
spectrum and their location.
Spectral Irregularity: Spectral irregularity measures the degree of varia-
tion of the successive peaks of a spectrum. This feature provides the ability to
capture the jitter or noise in a spectrum. Spectral irregularity is computed
as the sum of the square of the difference in amplitude between adjoining
spectral peaks [99] using the following equation:
Irregularity =
∑N
i=1(ai − ai+1)2∑N
i=1 a
2
i
(3.6)
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where the (N + 1)-th peak is assumed to be zero. A change in irregularity
changes the perceived timbre of a sound.
Spectral Spread: Spectral spread defines the dispersion of the spectrum
around its centroid, i.e., it measures the standard deviation of a spectrum.
So it can be computed as:
Spread, σ =
√√√√ N∑
i=1
[(fi − µ)2 · wi] (3.7)
where wi represents the weight of the i-th frequency component obtained
from Equation (3.4) and µ represents the centroid of the spectrum obtained
from Equation (3.3).
Spectral Skewness: Spectral skewness computes the coefficient of skew-
ness of a spectrum. Skewness (third central moment) measures the symmetry
of the distribution. A distribution can be positively skewed in which case
it has a long tail to the right while a negatively-skewed distribution has a
longer tail to the left. A symmetrical distribution has a skewness of zero. The
coefficient of skewness is the ratio of the skewness to the standard deviation
raised to the third power.
Skewness =
∑N
i=1 [(fi − µ)3 · wi]
σ3
(3.8)
Spectral Kurtosis: Spectral Kurtosis gives a measure of the flatness or
spikiness of a distribution relative to a normal distribution. It is computed
from the fourth central moment using the following function:
Kurtosis =
∑N
i=1 [(fi − µ)4 · wi]
σ4
(3.9)
A kurtosis value of 3 means the distribution is similar to a normal distribution
whereas values less than 3 refer to flatter distributions and values greater than
3 refer to steeper distributions.
Spectral Rolloff: The spectral rolloff is defined as the frequency below
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which 85% of the distribution magnitude is concentrated [76]
arg min
fc∈{1,...,N}
fc∑
i=1
mi ≥ 0.85 ·
N∑
i=1
mi (3.10)
where fc is the rolloff frequency and mi is the magnitude of the i-th frequency
component of the spectrum. The rolloff is another measure of spectral shape
that is correlated to the noise cutting frequency [100].
Spectral Brightness: Spectral brightness calculates the amount of spec-
tral energy corresponding to frequencies higher than a given cut-off threshold.
This metric correlates to the perceived timbre of a sound. Increase of higher
frequency energy in the spectrum yields a sharper timbre, whereas a decrease
yields a softer timbre [101]. Spectral brightness can be computed using the
following equation:
Brightnessfc =
N∑
i=fc
mi (3.11)
where fc is the cut-off frequency (set to 1500 Hz) and mi is the magnitude
of the i-th frequency component of the spectrum.
Spectral Flatness: Spectral flatness measures how energy is spread across
the spectrum, giving a high value when energy is equally distributed and a
low value when energy is concentrated in a few narrow frequency bands. The
spectral flatness is calculated by dividing the geometric mean of the power
spectrum by the arithmetic mean of the power spectrum [102]:
Flatness =
[∏N
i=1mi
]1/N
1
N
∑N
i=1mi
(3.12)
where mi represents the magnitude of bin number i. Spectral flatness pro-
vides a way to quantify the noise-like or tone-like nature of the signal. One
advantage of using spectral flatness is that it is not affected by the amplitude
of the signal, meaning spectral flatness virtually remains unchanged when the
distance between the sound source and microphone fluctuates during record-
ing.
Mel-Frequency Cepstrum Coefficients (MFCCs): MFCCs are short-
term spectral features and are widely used in the area of audio and speech
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processing [103, 76]. Their success has been due to their capability of com-
pactly representing spectrum amplitudes. Figure 3.7 highlights the procedure
for extracting MFCCs from audio signals. The first step is to divide the sig-
nal into fixed size frames (typically 50 ms chunks) by applying a windowing
function at fixed intervals. The next step is to take Discrete Fourier Trans-
form (DFT) of each frame. After taking the log-amplitude of the magnitude
spectrum, the DFT bins are grouped and smoothed according to the percep-
tually motivated Mel-frequency scaling.1 Finally, in order to decorrelate the
resulting feature vectors a discrete cosine transform is performed. We use
the first 13 coefficients for our experiments.
Frames Log
Mel-ScalingDCT
Audio
MFCCs
DFT
Figure 3.7: Procedure for extracting MFCCs from audio signals.
Chromagram: A chromagram (also known as harmonic pitch class pro-
file) is a 12-dimensional vector representation of an audio signal showing
the distribution of energy along the 12 distinct semitones or pitch classes.
First a DFT of the audio signal is taken and then the spectral frequencies
are mapped onto a limited set of 12 chroma values in a many-to-one fash-
ion [104]. In general, chromagram is robust to noise (e.g., ambient noise or
percussive sounds) and independent of timbre change.
Tonal Centroids: Tonal centroid introduced by Harte et al. [105] maps a
chromagram onto a 6-dimensional Hypertorus structure. The resulting rep-
resentation wraps around the surface of a Hypertorus, and can be visualized
as a set of three circles of harmonic pitch intervals: fifths, major thirds, and
minor thirds. Tonal centroids are efficient in detecting changes in harmonic
contents.
1Mel-scale approximates the human auditory response more closely than the linearly-
spaced frequency bands. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mel scale
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3.5 Classification Algorithms and Evaluation Metrics
Before we dig deep into the evaluation section, let us briefly describe the
classification algorithms and metrics that we used to determine how well we
can fingerprint smartphones using onboard microphones and speakers.
3.5.1 Classification Algorithms
We need some way to leverage the set of features to perform device identifica-
tion. To achieve this, we leverage a supervised classification algorithm, which
takes observations (features) from the observed device as input, and attempts
to classify the device into one of several previously-observed devices. To do
this, our approach works as follows. First, we perform a training step, by
collecting a number of observations from a set of devices. Each observation
(data point) corresponds to a set of features observed from that device, rep-
resented as a tuple with one dimension per feature. As such, data points can
be thought of as existing in a hyper-dimensional space, with each axis cor-
responding to the observed value of a corresponding feature. Our approach
then applies a classification algorithm to build a representation of these data
points, which can later be used to associate new observations with device
types. When a new observation is collected, the classification algorithm re-
turns the most likely device that caused the observation.
To do this effectively, we need an efficient classification algorithm. In our
work, we compare the performance of two alternate approaches described be-
low: k-nearest neighbors (associates an incoming data point with the device
corresponding to the nearest “learned” data points), and Gaussian mixture
models (computes a probability distribution for each device, and determines
the maximally-likely association).
k-NN: k-nearest neighbor algorithm (k-NN) is a non-parametric lazy learn-
ing algorithm. The term “non-parametric” means that the k-NN algorithm
does not make any assumptions about the underlying data distribution,
which is useful in analyzing real world data with complex underlying dis-
tribution. The term “lazy learning” means that the k-NN algorithm does
not use the training data to make any generalization, rather all the train-
ing data are used in the testing phase making it computationally expensive
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(however, different optimizations are possible). k-NN algorithm works by
first computing the distance from the input data point to all training data
points and then classifies the input data point by taking a majority vote of
the k closest training records in the feature space [106]. The best choice of k
depends upon the data; generally, larger values of k reduce the effect of noise
on the classification, but make boundaries between classes less distinct.
GMM: A Gaussian mixture model is a probabilistic model that assumes
all the data points are generated from a mixture of a finite number of Gaus-
sian distributions with unknown parameters. The unknown patterns and
mixture weights are estimated from training samples using an expectation–
maximization (EM) algorithm [107]. During the matching phase the finger-
print for an unknown recording is first compared with a database of pre-
computed GMMs and then the class label of the GMM that gives the high-
est likelihood is returned as the expected class for the unknown fingerprint.
GMMs are often used in biometric systems, most notably in human speaker
recognition systems, due to their capability of representing a large class of
sample distributions [108, 76].
For analyzing and matching fingerprints we use a desktop machine with the
following configuration: Intel i7-2600 3.4 GHz processor with 12 GiB RAM.
We found that the average time required to match a new fingerprint was
around 5–10 ms for k-NN classifier and around 0.5–1 ms for GMM classifier.
3.5.2 Evaluation Metrics:
We use standard multiclass classification metrics such as precision, recall,
and F-score [109] in our evaluation. Assuming there are fingerprints from
n classes (e.g., n different devices), we first compute the true positive (TP )
rate for each class, i.e., the number of traces from the class that are classified
correctly. Similarly, we compute the false positive (FP ) and false negative
(FN), as the number of wrongly accepted and wrongly rejected traces, re-
spectively, for each class i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). We then compute precision, recall,
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and F-score for each class using the following equations:
Precision, Pri =
TPi
TPi + FPi
(3.13)
Recall, Rei =
TPi
TPi + FNi
(3.14)
F-Score, Fi =
2× Pri ×Rei
Pri +Rei
(3.15)
F-score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall; it provides a good mea-
sure of overall classification performance, since precision and recall represent
a tradeoff: a more conservative classifier that rejects more instances will
have higher precision but lower recall, and vice versa. To obtain the overall
performance of the system we compute average values in the following way:
Avg. Precision, AvgPr =
∑n
i=1 Pri
n
(3.16)
Avg. Recall, AvgRe =
∑n
i=1Rei
n
(3.17)
Avg. F-Score, AvgF =
2× AvgPr × AvgRe
AvgPr + AvgRe
(3.18)
Each audio excerpt is recorded/played 10 times, 50% of which is used
for training and the remaining 50% is used for testing. The selection of
training and testing sample is done in random. To prevent any bias in the
selection of the training and testing set we rerun our experiments 10 times
and report the average F-score. We report the maximum evaluation obtained
by varying the number of nearest-neighbors (k) from 1 to 5 for k-NN classifier
and considering 1 to 5 Gaussian distributions per class for GMM classifier.
Since GMM parameters are produced by the randomized EM algorithm,
we perform 10 parameter-generation runs for each instance and report the
average classification performance. We also compute the 95% confidence
interval, but we found it to be less than 1% and therefore, do not report it
in the rest of the chapter.
3.6 Feature Exploration
At first glance, it might seem that we should use all features at our disposal
to identify device types. However, including too many features can worsen
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performance in practice, due to their varying accuracies and potentially-
conflicting signatures. Hence, in this section, we provide a framework to
explore all the 15 audio features described in Table 3.3 and identify the dom-
inating subset of all features, i.e., which combination of features should be
used. For this purpose we adopt a well known machine learning strategy
known as feature selection [110, 111]. Feature selection is the process of
reducing dimensionality of data by selecting only a subset of the relevant
features for use in model construction. The main assumption in using fea-
ture selection technique is that the data may contain redundant features.
Redundant features are those which provide no additional benefit than the
currently selected features. Feature selection techniques are a subset of the
more general field of feature extraction, however, in practice they are quite
different from each other. Feature extraction creates new features as func-
tions of the original features, whereas feature selection returns a subset of
the original features. It is preferable to use feature selection over feature
extraction when the original units and meaning of features are important
and the modeling goal is to identify an influential subset. When the features
themselves have different dimensionality, and numerical transformations are
inappropriate, feature selection becomes the primary means of dimension
reduction.
Feature selection involves the maximization of an objective function as it
searches through the possible candidate subsets. Since exhaustive evaluation
of all possible subsets are often infeasible (2N for a total of N features)
different heuristics are employed. We use a greedy search strategy known
as sequential forward selection (SFS) where we start off with an empty set
and sequentially add the features that maximize our objective function. The
pseudo code of our feature selection algorithm is described in Algorithm 1.
The algorithm works as follows. First, we compute the F-score that can
be achieved by each feature individually. Next, we sort the features based
on their achieved F-score in descending order. Then, we iteratively add
features starting from the most dominant one and compute the F-score of
the combined feature subset. If adding a feature increases the F-score seen
so far we move on to the next feature, else we remove the feature under
inspection. Having traversed through the entire set of features, we return
the subset of features that maximizes our device classification task. Note
that this is a greedy approach, therefore, the generated subset might not
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Algorithm 1 Sequential Feature Selection (SFS).
Input: Input feature set F
Output: Dominant feature subset D
F score← [ ]
for f ∈ F do
F score[f ]← Classify(f)
end for
F ′ ← sort(F, F score) #In descending order
max score← 0
D ← ∅
for f ∈ F ′ do
D ← D ∪ f
temp← Classify(D)
if temp > max score then
max score← temp
else
D ← D − {f}
end if
end for
return D
always provide the optimal F-score. However, for our purpose, we found this
approach to perform well, as we demonstrate in our evaluation section. We
test our feature selection algorithm for all three types of audio excerpts listed
in Table 3.2. We report the maximum F-score obtained by varying k from
1 to 5 for k-NN classifier and also considering 1 to 5 Gaussian distributions
per class for GMM classifier.
3.6.1 Feature Exploration for Different Make and Model
First, we look at features obtained from smartphones manufactured by five
different vendors. We take one representative smartphone from each row
of Table 3.1 giving us a total of 7 different phones. Each type of audio is
recorded 10 times giving us a total of 70 samples from the 7 representative
handsets; 50% of which (i.e., 5 samples per handset) is randomly selected for
training and the remaining 50% is used for testing. All the training samples
are labeled with their corresponding handset identifier. Both classifiers return
the class label for each audio clip in the test set and from that we compute
F-score.
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Table 3.4: Feature exploration for different make and model smartphones
using only speaker.
# Feature
Fingerprinting Speakers
Maximum F-Score (%)
Instrumental Human Speech Song
k-NN GMM k-NN GMM k-NN GMM
1 RMS 97.4 98 80.8 78.3 88.8 86.2
2 ZCR 57.6 52.1 63.7 48.6 77 77
3 Low-Energy-Rate 69.2 51.8 52.8 38.2 59.6 58.8
4 Spectral Centroid 91.5 88.4 59.4 55.8 88.1 87.7
5 Spectral Entropy 84 80.5 59.4 46.5 91.5 91
6 Spectral Irregularity 31.3 51.4 37.5 46.8 43.2 50.3
7 Spectral Spread 90.2 89.2 56.7 56.7 91 85.7
8 Spectral Skewness 68.3 82.1 69 62 82.9 79.9
9 Spectral Kurtosis 76.7 79.5 68.1 60.2 88.6 86.9
10 Spectral Rolloff 86.6 86.4 85.8 66.7 74.8 76.1
11 Spectral Brightness 87.5 85.2 70.9 87.7 85.5 77.1
12 Spectral Flatness 84.5 84 61.6 61.3 95.1 97.4
13 MFCCs 97.4 100 100 100 94.8 100
14 Chromagram 84.3 79.4 81.1 100 97.4 100
15 Tonal Centroid 86.4 88.4 80.3 98.2 100 100
Sequential Feature Selection [1,7] [13] [13] [13] [15] [13]
Max F-Score 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table 3.4 highlights the subset of features selected by our sequential feature
selection algorithm for features obtained from different brands of smartphone
speakers. We find that most of the time MFCCs are the dominant features for
all categories of audio excerpt. We see similar outcomes for features obtained
from different brands of smartphone microphones in Table 3.5. And when we
combine both speaker and microphone (Table 3.6), we see that both MFCCs
and Tonal Centroids provide high F-scores.
3.6.2 Feature Exploration for Same Make and Model
Next, we look at features obtained from phones manufactured by the same
vendor and are of the same model. From Table 3.1 we see that we have 15
Motorola Droid A855 handsets, which is the largest number among all the
other types of phones in our collection. We, therefore, use these 15 devices
for all the experiments in this section. Again, each type of audio is recorded
10 times giving us a total of 150 samples from the 15 handsets; 50% of which
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Table 3.5: Feature exploration for different make and model smartphones
using only microphone.
# Feature
Fingerprinting Microphones
Maximum F-Score (%)
Instrumental Human Speech Song
k-NN GMM k-NN GMM k-NN GMM
1 RMS 87.2 84.4 62.7 70.3 80.2 82.8
2 ZCR 76.4 74.3 75.7 76.8 72.4 71.3
3 Low-Energy-Rate 47 42.2 26 19.5 38.8 36.6
4 Spectral Centroid 73.7 69.7 70 77.9 73.7 76
5 Spectral Entropy 52.1 56.5 68 59.8 68.8 58.8
6 Spectral Irregularity 49.3 55 52.6 49.7 53 48.7
7 Spectral Spread 90.4 86.2 50.5 54.8 81.6 76.5
8 Spectral Skewness 71.4 63.4 65.6 63.6 61.8 49.7
9 Spectral Kurtosis 63.9 61.2 65.2 65.1 85.4 58
10 Spectral Rolloff 37.8 42.7 82.9 83.8 67.7 73
11 Spectral Brightness 66.4 64.8 60.3 60.2 63.7 67.4
12 Spectral Flatness 92.5 92.5 66.7 68.9 74.8 74.4
13 MFCCs 94.8 94.8 79.9 92.1 90.4 95.4
14 Chromagram 88.4 77.7 88.7 86 78.4 87.7
15 Tonal Centroid 91.9 92.7 92.1 86.4 89.6 92.5
Sequential Feature Selection [13,1] [13,1,7] [15,9,1] [13,15,11] [13,1,12] [13,1,9]
Max F-Score 97.4 100 92.1 93 92.5 97.4
is randomly selected for training and the remaining 50% is used for testing.
Table 3.7 shows the maximum F-score achieved by each acoustic feature
for the three different types of audio excerpt. The table also highlights the
dominating subset of features selected by our sequential feature selection
algorithm. We again find that MFCCs are the dominant features for all
categories of audio excerpt.
We observe similar results for same make and model microphones as shown
in Table 3.8. Even when we test audio segments that combine features from
both the phone’s built-in speaker and microphone we see that MFCCs are still
the dominant features among all the acoustic features (shown in Table 3.9).
One thing that is noticeable — in general the F-score for same make and
model devices is lower compared to what we get for different make and model
devices. This is understandable as same make and model devices contain the
same brand of speakers and microphones whereas different make and model
devices might contain different brands of speakers and microphones. Thus, it
is only trivial that fingerprinting same brand of speakers and/or microphones
is going to be a harder problem.
To get a better understanding of why MFCCs are the dominant acoustic
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Table 3.6: Feature exploration for different make and model smartphones
using both speaker and microphone.
# Feature
Fingerprinting Speakers and Microphones
Maximum F-Score (%)
Instrumental Human Speech Song
k-NN GMM k-NN GMM k-NN GMM
1 RMS 93.1 92.7 89 80.8 93.1 96.3
2 ZCR 83.3 83.3 84.6 78.8 93.1 96.3
3 Low-Energy-Rate 93.1 90 81.7 77.7 96.3 96.3
4 Spectral Centroid 82.3 85.1 40.5 42.7 74.2 76.1
5 Spectral Entropy 78.3 72.4 81 67.9 96.3 96.3
6 Spectral Irregularity 74.6 72.7 55.4 53.6 90.1 81.1
7 Spectral Spread 86.5 86.5 92.7 92.4 93.1 93.1
8 Spectral Skewness 92.3 89.7 84.6 86.2 96.3 96.3
9 Spectral Kurtosis 89.5 86.3 60.7 59.5 81.6 85.3
10 Spectral Rolloff 100 96.3 92.7 92.7 100 96
11 Spectral Brightness 80.4 79.4 81.6 67.6 87.4 90.2
12 Spectral Flatness 85.1 85.1 96.3 92.7 100 96.3
13 MFCCs 93.1 100 96.3 96.3 92.7 100
14 Chromagram 96.3 93.1 88.6 96.3 86.5 100
15 Tonal Centroid 96.3 100 96.3 96.3 100 100
Sequential Feature Selection [10] [13] [12] [13] [10] [13]
Max F-Score 100 100 96.3 96.3 100 100
features we plot the MFCCs of a given audio excerpt from three different
handsets on Figure 3.8. All the coefficients are ranked in the same order for
the three handsets. We can see that the magnitude of the coefficients vary
across the handsets. For example, coefficient 3 and 5 vary significantly across
the three handsets. Hence, MFCCs contain high degree of variability making
it the dominant feature for fingerprinting smartphones.
3.6.3 Feature Exploration for Large Pool of Devices
Lastly, we look at features from all the devices in our collection. In this case
we combine microphone and speaker to generate the auditory fingerprint for
smartphones. We do so because in the previous sections we found that com-
bining speaker and microphone yields the highest accuracy. To collectively
fingerprint smartphones using both the embedded microphone and speaker
we use our android app to play and record audio clips simultaneously. We,
therefore, limit ourself to only android devices for this experiment. In our
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Table 3.7: Feature exploration for same make and model smartphones
using only speaker.
# Feature
Fingerprinting Speakers
Maximum F-Score (%)
Instrumental Human Speech Song
k-NN GMM k-NN GMM k-NN GMM
1 RMS 34.9 33.8 16.6 12.3 20 25.7
2 ZCR 29.7 26.5 12.2 14.4 13 7.1
3 Low-Energy-Rate 12.5 14.8 15 5.7 21.8 18.7
4 Spectral Centroid 28 30.5 12.2 19 39.9 40.3
5 Spectral Entropy 20.9 19.8 14.2 16.6 33.9 26.3
6 Spectral Irregularity 14.5 11.7 7.4 14.7 11.8 17.5
7 Spectral Spread 36.4 43.7 11.3 14.3 35.2 38.4
8 Spectral Skewness 33.9 29.1 13.3 15.5 31.5 40.3
9 Spectral Kurtosis 30.5 29.1 11.6 16 31.1 36.8
10 Spectral Rolloff 40.4 39 14.9 14.3 38.7 41.1
11 Spectral Brightness 32.1 31.6 18.9 21.8 18.5 17.9
12 Spectral Flatness 34.9 31 19.8 13.3 32.4 30
13 MFCCs 90.4 96.5 91.3 97.5 90 91.4
14 Chromagram 79.1 70.6 72.9 66 80.6 80
15 Tonal Centroid 77 60 65.4 53.4 63.6 53.8
Sequential Feature Selection [13,14] [13,14] [13] [13,14] [13,7] [13,14]
Max F-Score 97.5 97.7 93.7 98.2 91.5 92.9
collection we had a total of 50 android devices (iphone5 and Sony Ericsson
W518 were the two non-android devices in our collection). Table 3.10 high-
lights our findings. We see that again MFCCs are the dominant features for
all categories of audio excerpt. This is expected as we saw similar outcomes
in Table 3.6 and Table 3.9.
3.7 Experimental Evaluations
We perform a series of experiments to evaluate how well we can fingerprint
smartphones by exploiting the manufacturing imperfections of microphones
and speakers embedded in them. We look at fingerprinting devices, first, of
different make and model, followed by devices of same make and model, and
finally a combination of both with multiple units of different models. Note
that the audio excerpts used for feature exploration and the ones used for
evaluating our fingerprinting approach in this section are not identical. We
use different audio excerpts belonging to the same three categories listed in
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Table 3.8: Feature exploration for same make and model smartphones
using only microphone.
# Feature
Fingerprinting Microphones
Maximum F-Score (%)
Instrumental Human Speech Song
k-NN GMM k-NN GMM k-NN GMM
1 RMS 40.2 36.9 19.6 20.1 23.5 28.6
2 ZCR 22.7 29.6 26.2 22.6 44.5 41.9
3 Low-Energy-Rate 22.6 24.8 5.2 7.4 10.7 13.4
4 Spectral Centroid 17.3 24.8 16.6 12.9 33.7 35.7
5 Spectral Entropy 29.1 22.2 15.2 15.1 40.3 36
6 Spectral Irregularity 12.6 16.3 13.2 17.9 15.8 18.6
7 Spectral Spread 17.2 22.6 16.4 14.9 36.2 34.8
8 Spectral Skewness 31.8 28.1 20.8 13.7 38 43.1
9 Spectral Kurtosis 28.5 26.1 20.3 14 45.8 39.2
10 Spectral Rolloff 30 32.8 15.1 11.6 46.1 44
11 Spectral Brightness 22.5 20.3 12.6 16 33.1 27.4
12 Spectral Flatness 24.6 23.8 17.2 12.2 39.2 35.5
13 MFCCs 89 93.5 98.8 96.2 94.1 97.5
14 Chromagram 71.5 55.3 75 88.7 87.3 85.3
15 Tonal Centroid 67.8 51.3 70 70.8 83.1 79.4
Sequential Feature Selection [13,8,12] [13,8,12] [13] [13,14,2] [13,14,10] [13,14]
Max F-Score 93 96.7 98.8 97.5 96.3 97.9
Table 3.2, so as to not bias our evaluations. All the evaluations are done
with 50% of the samples (randomly chosen) being used for training and the
remaining 50% for testing.
3.7.1 Fingerprinting Different Make and Model Devices
First, we look at fingerprinting devices of different make and model. So,
we take one representative smartphone from each row of Table 3.1 giving
us a total of 7 different phones. We test our fingerprinting approach using
all three types of audio excerpt. To generate fingerprints we only use the
acoustics features obtained from our sequential feature selection algorithm
as listed in Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6. Table 3.11 summarizes our findings. From
Table 3.11 we see that we can successfully, with an F-score of 100%, identify
which audio clip originated from which smartphone. Similar to speaker, we
also find that microphone properties differ quite substantially across vendors.
We see that by using only the microphone to fingerprint smartphones we can
achieve an F-score of over 97%. Combining microphone with speaker the
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Table 3.9: Feature exploration for same make and model smartphones
using both speaker and microphone.
# Feature
Fingerprinting Speakers and Microphones
Maximum F-Score (%)
Instrumental Human Speech Song
k-NN GMM k-NN GMM k-NN GMM
1 RMS 87.2 83 92.1 93 89.5 89.2
2 ZCR 59.8 60.5 56.8 58.4 67.6 75.2
3 Low-Energy-Rate 67.4 70.9 30.1 36.7 69.7 64.5
4 Spectral Centroid 30.1 27.5 25.7 30.1 35.1 32.7
5 Spectral Entropy 78.5 70.3 52.9 54.8 81.8 81.8
6 Spectral Irregularity 63.9 54.6 32.5 33.6 62.5 67.1
7 Spectral Spread 84.6 81.3 67.6 62.8 87 87.4
8 Spectral Skewness 85.7 88.3 58.7 54.4 70.9 68.9
9 Spectral Kurtosis 80.3 80.6 51.9 49.9 82.2 76.2
10 Spectral Rolloff 79.4 73.4 46.9 51.5 77.2 71.8
11 Spectral Brightness 86 88 75.2 69.2 87.5 79.5
12 Spectral Flatness 79.8 79 45.5 45.4 86.4 87.2
13 MFCCs 100 100 98.7 100 100 100
14 Chromagram 98.8 95.8 97.6 100 100 96.5
15 Tonal Centroid 98.8 94.8 95.2 92.7 100 98.8
Sequential Feature Selection [13] [13] [13] [13] [13] [13]
Max F-Score 100 100 98.7 100 100 100
F-score bumps back up to 100%.2 Thus, a malicious app having access to
speaker and/or microphone can successfully fingerprint smartphones using
only a few acoustic features.
3.7.2 Fingerprinting Same Make and Model Devices
We now look at fingerprinting the 15 Motorola Droid A855 handsets. Ta-
ble 3.12 highlights our findings. We test our fingerprinting approach against
three different forms of audio excerpt. We use the acoustic features obtained
from our sequential feature selection algorithm as listed in Tables 3.7, 3.8
and 3.9. From Table 3.12, we see that we can achieve an F-score of over 94%
in identifying which audio clip originated from which handset using only
the speaker as our source for generating the fingerprints. Using only micro-
phones we can bump up the F-score to 95%. However, we obtain the best
2For fingerprinting smartphones through both microphone and speaker we use our
android app for data collection. And as a result we exclude iPhone5 and Sony Ericsson
W518 handset from this experiment, reducing the pool of handsets to 5 devices.
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Figure 3.8: MFCCs for a given audio sample taken from three different
handsets manufactured by the same vendor. We can see that some of the
coefficients vary significantly, thus enabling us to exploit this feature to
fingerprint smartphones.
result when we consider fingerprinting both the speaker and microphone. In
that case we achieve an F-score of 100%. In other words we were able to
fingerprint all test samples correctly when we combined anomalies from both
the embedded microphone and speaker. So, if a malicious app can get access
to the speaker (which does not require explicit permission) and microphone
(which may require explicit permission, but many games nowadays require
access to microphone anyway) it can successfully track individual devices.
3.7.3 Fingerprinting All Make and Model Devices
Lastly, we evaluate how effectively we can fingerprint the 50 android smart-
phones in our collection. The setting is similar to all the previous experiments
where each audio clip is recorded 10 times, 50% of which is used for training
and the remaining 50% for testing. We use our android app to collect all
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Table 3.10: Feature exploration for 50 android smartphones.
# Feature
Maximum F-Score (%)
Instrumental Human Speech Song
k-NN GMM k-NN GMM k-NN GMM
1 RMS 82.7 80 87.3 84 78.7 76.8
2 ZCR 51.3 48.2 50.3 45.9 48.5 45.9
3 Low-Energy-Rate 45.2 40.6 19.4 15.4 31.9 33.8
4 Spectral Centroid 35.6 34.7 23.7 25.8 25.7 30.1
5 Spectral Entropy 56.2 60.8 46.3 48.1 67.7 67.7
6 Spectral Irregularity 46.1 47 25.9 23.6 26.9 35.3
7 Spectral Spread 57.4 57 54.2 49.7 70.9 74.1
8 Spectral Skewness 50.3 53.9 34.5 32.5 52.7 59.9
9 Spectral Kurtosis 45 47.7 37.1 38.6 51.5 54.2
10 Spectral Rolloff 49.5 53.5 48.4 45.9 59.1 62.8
11 Spectral Brightness 52.1 54.5 38.1 35.3 59.2 61.7
12 Spectral Flatness 61 60.1 61.6 63.4 67.3 68.3
13 MFCCs 100 100 100 99.6 100 99.6
14 Chromagram 96.2 93.4 98.9 95.8 99.6 98.2
15 Tonal Centroid 96 89 95.5 91.8 98.5 98.5
Sequential Feature Selection [13] [13] [13] [13] [13] [13]
Max F-Score 100 100 100 99.6 100 99.6
Table 3.11: Fingerprinting different make and model devices.
Hardware
Avg. F-Score (%)
Instrumental Human Speech Song
k-NN GMM k-NN GMM k-NN GMM
Speaker 97.4 100 94.8 100 97.4 100
Microphone 94.8 100 94.8 97.4 97.4 100
Speaker+Microphone 96.3 100 96.3 100 96.3 100
Table 3.12: Fingerprinting same make and model devices.
Hardware
Avg. F-Score (%)
Instrumental Human Speech Song
k-NN GMM k-NN GMM k-NN GMM
Speaker 96.3 98.3 98.8 98.8 92.6 94.5
Microphone 95.3 95.3 98.8 100 96.2 96.1
Speaker+Microphone 100 100 100 100 100 100
the audio samples. Table 3.13 summarizes our fingerprinting results. We
see that we can obtain an F-score of over 98% in fingerprinting all the 50
smartphones. This result suggests that fingerprinting smartphones via mi-
crophones and speakers is truly feasible.
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Table 3.13: Fingerprinting heterogeneous devices.
Hardware
Avg. F-Score (%)
Instrumental Human Speech Song
k-NN GMM k-NN GMM k-NN GMM
Speaker+Microphone 99 98.3 99.6 99.3 99.6 100
3.8 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we investigate how different factors such as audio sampling
rate, training set size, the distance between audio-source and recorder, and
background noise impact our fingerprinting accuracy. Such investigations will
help us determine the conditions under which our fingerprinting approach will
be feasible, specially if the attacker is tracking devices in public locations.
For the following set of experiments we only focus on fingerprinting similar
model smartphones from the same vendor (as this has been shown to be a
tougher problem in the previous sections) and consider only fingerprinting
speakers as this is applicable to the scenario where the attacker is tracking
devices in public locations. We also consider recording only ringtones (i.e.,
audio clips belonging to our defined ‘Instrumental’ category in Table 3.2)
for the following experiments. Since we are recording ringtones, we use the
features highlighted in Table 3.7 under the ‘Instrumental’ category.
3.8.1 Impact of Sampling Rate
First, we investigate how the sampling rate of audio signals impacts our fin-
gerprinting precision. To do this, we record a ringtone at the following three
frequencies: 8 kHz, 22.05 kHz and 44.1 kHz. Each sample is recorded 10
times with half of them being used for training and the other half for testing.
Figure 3.9 shows the average precision and recall obtained under different
sampling rates. As we can see from the figure, as sampling frequency de-
creases, the precision/recall also goes down. This is understandable, because
the higher the sampling frequency the more fine-tuned information we have
about the audio sample. However, the default sampling frequency on most
hand-held devices today is 44.1 kHz [112], with some of the latest models
adopting even higher sampling rates [113]. We, therefore, believe sampling
rate will not impose any obstacles for our fingerprinting approach, and in
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future we will be able to capture more fine grained variations with the use
of higher sampling rates.
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Figure 3.9: Impact of sampling frequency on precision/recall.
3.8.2 Impact Training Set Size
Next, we consider performance of the classifiers in the presence of limited
training data. For this experiment we vary the training set size from 10% to
50% (i.e., from 1 to 5 samples per device) of all available samples. Figure 3.10
shows the evolution of the F-score as training set size is increased. We see
that as the training set size increases the F-score also rises which is expected.
However, we see that even with only three samples per device we can achieve
an F-score of over 90%. This suggests that we do not need too many training
samples to construct a good predictive model.
3.8.3 Impact of Distance between Speaker and Recorder
Now, we inspect how fingerprinting accuracy degrades as the distance be-
tween the audio source (i.e., smartphone) and recorder (i.e., laptop/PC) is
varied. For this experiment we use a separate external microphone as the
signal capturing capacity of the microphone embedded inside a laptop de-
grades drastically as distance increases. We use the relatively inexpensive
($44.79) Audio-Technica ATR-6550 shotgun microphone for this experiment
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Figure 3.10: Impact of varying training set size on accuracy.
and vary the distance between the external microphone and smartphone from
0.1 meter to 5 meters. Figure 3.11 summarizes how F-scores changes as the
distance between the smartphone and microphone is varied. We see that as
distance increases, F-score decreases. This is expected, because the longer
the distance between the smartphone and microphone, the harder it becomes
to capture the minuscule deviations between audio samples. However, we see
that even up to two meters we can achieve an F-score of around 93%. This
suggests that our device fingerprinting approach works only up to a certain
distance using off-the-shelf inexpensive commercial microphones. However,
using specialized microphones, such as parabolic microphones (usually used
in capturing animal sounds from a far distance), could help increase the
fingerprinting precision even at longer distances.
3.8.4 Impact of Ambient Background Noise
In this section we investigate how ambient background noise impacts the
performance of our fingerprinting technique. For this experiment we consider
scenarios where there is a crowd of people using their smartphones and we
are trying to fingerprint those devices by capturing audio signals (in this case
ringtones) from the surrounding environment. Table 3.14 highlights the four
different scenarios that we consider. To emulate such environment, external
speakers (2 pieces) are placed between the smartphone and microphone while
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Figure 3.11: Impact of varying the distance between smartphone and
microphone.
recording is taking place. The external speakers are constantly replaying the
respective ambient noise in the background. We consider a distance of two
meters from the audio source to recorder as shown in Figure 3.12.
Figure 3.12: Experimental setup for determining the impact of ambient
background noise.
The ambient background sounds were obtained from PacDV [114] and
SoundJay [115]. We also compute the signal-to-noise (SNR) ratio between
the original ringtone and the different ambient background noise. The RMS
(root-mean-square) value of the different background noise varied from ap-
proximately 13% (17.77 dB) to 18% (14.92 dB) of the RMS value of the
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ringtone under consideration. Table 3.14 shows our findings (values are re-
ported as percentages). We can see that even in the presence of various
background noise we can achieve an F-score of over 91%.
Table 3.14: Impact of ambient background noise.
Environments
SNR
k-NN GMM
(dB)
Features [13,14]∗ Features [13,14]∗
AvgPr AvgRe AvgF1 AvgPr AvgRe AvgF1
Shopping Mall 15.85 88.8 85.3 87 95.1 93.3 94.2
Restaurant/Cafe 17.77 90.5 89.7 90.1 92.5 90.7 91.6
City Park 15.43 91.7 90 90.8 95.2 94.1 94.6
Airport Gate 14.92 91.3 89.5 90.4 94.5 93.3 93.9
∗ Feature numbers taken from Table 3.7
3.9 Limitations
Our approach has a few limitations. First, we experimented with 52 devices
manufactured by different vendors; it is possible that a larger target device
pool would result in lower accuracy. That said, distinctions across different
device types are more clear; additionally, audio fingerprints may be used
in tandem with other techniques, such as accelerometer fingerprinting [83],
to better discriminate between devices. Secondly, most of the experiments
took place in a lab setting. However, we studied the impact of ambient
background noise and still found our approach to be applicable. Lastly, all
the phones used in our experiments were not in mint condition and some of
the idiosyncrasies of individual microphones and speakers may have been the
result of uneven wear and tear on each device; we believe, however, that this
is likely to occur in the real world as well.
3.10 Summary
In this chapter we show that it is feasible to fingerprint smartphones through
onboard acoustic components like microphones and speakers. As microphone
and speaker are one of the most standard components present in almost all
smartphones available today, this creates a key privacy concern for users.
To demonstrate the feasibility of this approach, we collect fingerprints from
48
52 different phones covering a total of five different brands of smartphones.
Our studies show that it is possible to successfully fingerprint smartphones
through microphones and speakers, not only under controlled environments,
but also in the presence of ambient noise. We believe our findings are im-
portant steps towards understanding the full consequences of fingerprinting
smartphones through acoustic channels.
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CHAPTER 4
FINGERPRINTING SMARTPHONES VIA
MOTION SENSORS
Motion sensors play a critical role in making smartphones smart. It is be-
cause of motion sensors that users can enjoy sophisticated applications such
as 3-D gaming, augmented reality and fitness monitoring. Motions sensors
provide consumers with a more interactive user experience. Gesture and ac-
tivity based applications are quickly gaining popularity among consumers.
However, these same sensors can be used as side-channels to uniquely track
smartphones. Disturbingly, access to motions sensors is deemed non-sensitive
and thus requires no explicit user permission for accessing them. As a result,
JavaScript embedded in any public web page can easily and surreptitiously
access these sensors while the user is browsing the web page. This would
enable any website to fingerprint the manufacturing imperfections of these
sensors and thereby track physical devices across multiple visits.
4.1 Overview
First, we start with an overview of our approach and describe the attack sce-
nario. Motion sensors such as accelerometers and gyroscopes are available
not only to installed applications but also to HTML5 [116]. And interest-
ingly, websites do not require any explicit permission to access these motion
sensors. So our attack scenario consists of setting up a web page to surrep-
titiously collect accelerometer and gyroscope data as shown in Figure 4.1.
All that is needed is a small block of JavaScript to access and transmit the
sensor data to our server. From the collected data we then aim to “pull out”
the imperfections in sensor circuitry. Manufacturing imperfections result in
each sensor having unique characteristics in their produced signal. These
characteristics can be captured in the form of a fingerprint and be used to
track users across multiple websites. However, practical fingerprinting faces
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several challenges. During a typical web browsing session, a smartphone is ei-
ther held in a user’s hand, resulting in noisy motion inputs, or is resting on a
flat surface, minimizing the amount of sensor input. Additionally, web APIs
for accessing motion sensor data have significantly lower resolution than what
is available to the operating system and native applications. We show that,
using machine learning techniques, it is possible to combine a large number
of features from both the accelerometer and gyroscope sensor and produce
highly accurate classification despite these challenges. In some cases, we can
improve the classifier accuracy by using an inaudible sound, played through
the speakers, to stimulate the motion sensors. We evaluate our techniques
in a variety of lab settings; additionally, we collected data from volunteer
participants over the web, capturing a wide variety of smartphone models
and operating systems. In our experiments, a web browsing session lasting
in the orders of 25–30 seconds is sufficient to generate a fingerprint that can
be used to recognize the phone in the future with only 5–6 seconds worth of
web browsing session.
Figure 4.1: Fingerprinting motion sensors through HTML5.
4.2 Data Collection Setup and Data Processing
In this section we will depict our data collection process. We will also describe
our data processing steps.
4.2.1 Data Collection Setup
Given that mobile accounts for a third of all global web pages served [117],
our data collection process consists of developing our own web page to collect
sensor data.1 We obtain IRB approval for collecting sensor data. Our web
1http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/DataCollectionHowPlaced.html
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page contains a JavaScript to access motion sensors like accelerometer and
gyroscope. We create an event listener for device motion in the following
manner:
window.addEventListener(‘devicemotion’,motionHandler)
Once the event listener is registered, the motionHandler function can access
accelerometer and gyroscope data in the following manner:
function motionHandler(event){
// Access Accelerometer Data
ax = event.accelerationIncludingGravity.x;
ay = event.accelerationIncludingGravity.y;
az = event.accelerationIncludingGravity.z;
// Access Gyroscope Data
rR = event.rotationRate;
if (rR != null){
gx = rR.alpha;
gy = rR.beta ;
gz = rR.gamma;
}
}
However, since we collect data through the browser the maximum ob-
tainable sampling frequency is lower than the available hardware sampling
frequency (restricted by the underlying OS). Table 4.1 summarizes the sam-
pling frequencies obtained from the top 5 mobile browsers [118].2 We use
a Samsung Galaxy S3 and iPhone 5 to test the sampling frequency of the
different browsers. Table 4.1 also highlights the motion sensors that are ac-
cessible from the different browsers. We see that Chrome provides the best
sampling frequency on both platforms while the default Android browser is
the most restrictive browser in terms of not only sampling frequency but
also access to different motion sensors. Chrome being the most popular mo-
bile browser [119], we collect data using the Chrome browser. One thing
to remember is that the sample rate available at any instance of time de-
pends on multiple factors such as the current battery life and the number of
applications running in the background.
2Computed the average time to obtain 100 samples. http://datarepo.cs.illinois.edu/
SamplingFreq.html
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Table 4.1: Sampling frequency from different browsers.
OS Browser
Sampling Accessible
Frequency (∼Hz) Sensors∗
Android 4.4
Chrome 100 A,G
Android 20 A
Opera 100 A,G
UC Browser 20 A,G
Standalone App [120] 200 A,G
iOS 8.1.3
Safari 100 A,G
Chrome 100 A,G
Standalone App [121] 100 A,G
∗ ‘A’ means accelerometer and ‘G’ refers to gyroscope
Now, since our fingerprinting approach aims to capture the inherent im-
perfections of motion sensors, we need to keep the sensors stationary while
collecting data. Therefore, by default, we have the phone placed flat on
a surface while data is being collected, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
This mimics the scenario where the user has placed his/her smartphone on
a desk while browsing a web page. We, however, do test our approach for
the scenario where the user is holding the smartphone in his/her hand while
sitting down quietly. Also, as gyroscopes react to audio stimulation we collect
data under three different background audio-settings. Table 4.2 describes the
three types of audio stimulation. For the latter two audio stimulations the
corresponding audio file is played in the background of the browser while
data is being collected. Under each setting we collect 10 samples where each
sample is about 5 to 6 seconds worth of data (so, total data collection time
is in the range of 1 minute per setting). Our web page collects all sensor
data is in the background without interfering with the user’s browsing expe-
rience and then sends the data to our back-end server for analysis. For the
purpose of labeling our data we plant a unique random number inside the
cookie. This provides us with ground truth data, thus, making it possible to
correlate data samples coming from the same physical device.3
Screenshots of our data collection website is provided in Figure 4.2. As
you can see from the figure users are first asked to place the device on a flat
surface before proceeding to the next step of the data collection process.
3It is possible that users cleared this cookie, but we do not expect this to happen with
enough frequency to significantly affect our data.
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Table 4.2: Types of background audio stimulation.
Type Description
No-audio No audio stimulation present
Sine 20 kHz sine wave played through the speaker
Song A popular song played through the speaker
(a) Instruction page (b) Settings for data collection
Figure 4.2: Screenshots of our data collection website. Users are first
asked to place the device on a flat surface before selecting a specific
background audio-stimulation.
4.2.2 Data Processing
Data from motion sensors can be thought of as a stream of timestamped
real values. For both accelerometer and gyroscope we obtain values along
three axes. So, for a given timestamp, t, we have two vectors of the following
form: ~a(t) = (ax, ay, az) and ~ω(t) = (ωx, ωy, ωz). The accelerometer values
include gravity, i.e., when the device is stationary lying flat on top of a sur-
face we get a value of 9.81 ms−2 along the z-axis. We convert the acceleration
vector into a scalar by taking its magnitude: |~a(t)| = √a2x + a2y + a2z. This
technique discards some information, but has the advantage of making the
accelerometer data independent of device orientation; i.e., if the device is sta-
tionary the acceleration magnitude will always be around 9.81 ms−2, whereas
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the reading on each individual axis will vary greatly (by +/- 1g) depending
on how the device is held. For the gyroscope we consider data from each
axis as a separate stream, since there is no corresponding baseline rotational
speed. In other words, if the device is stationary the rotation rate along all
three axes should be close to 0 rads−1, irrespective of the orientation of the
device. Thus, our model considers four streams of sensor data in the form of
{|~a(t)|, ωx(t), ωy(t), ωz(t)}.
For all data streams, we also look at frequency domain characteristics.
But since the browser, running as one of many applications inside the phone,
makes API calls to collect sensor data the OS might not necessarily respond in
a synchronized manner.4 This results in non-equally spaced data points. We,
therefore, use cubic-spline interpolation [122] to construct new data points
such that {|~a(t)|, ωx(t), ωy(t), ωz(t)} become equally-spaced.
4.3 Temporal and Spectral Features
To summarize the characteristics of a sensor data stream, we explore a total
of 25 features consisting of 10 temporal and 15 spectral features (listed in
Table 4.3). As we have four data streams, we have a total of 100 features
to summarize the unique characteristics of the motion sensors. A brief de-
scription of each feature follows, but since many of the features overlap with
the features described in Section 3.4, we refrain ourselves from describing the
overlapping features.
Mean Signal Value: This feature computes the arithmetic mean of a
signal amplitude. In the case of a set of N values {x1, x2, . . . , xN}, the mean
value is given by the following formula:
µ =
1
N
(x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xN) (4.1)
The mean value provides an approximation of the average signal strength.
Signal Standard Deviation: This feature computes the dispersion in
signal strength. For a set of N values {x1, x2, . . . , xN}, the standard deviation
4Depending on current load and priority of other running applications, OS might
prioritize such API calls differently.
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Table 4.3: Explored temporal and spectral features.
# Domain Feature
1
Time
Mean
2 Standard Deviation
3 Average Deviation
4 Skewness
5 Kurtosis
6 RMS
7 Max
8 Min
9 ZCR
10 Non-Negative count
11
Frequency
Spectral RMS
12 Low-Energy-Rate
13 Spectral Centroid
14 Spectral Entropy
15 Spectral Irregularity
16 Spectral Spread
17 Spectral Skewness
18 Spectral Kurtosis
19 Spectral Rolloff
20 Spectral Brightness
21 Spectral Flatness
22 Spectral Roughness
23 Spectral Flux
24 Spectral Attack Time
25 Spectral Attack Slope
is given by the following formula:
σ =
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(xi − µ)2 (4.2)
where µ refers to the mean signal strength. Standard deviation measures the
spread of a signal strength.
Average Deviation: This feature measures the average distance from
mean. In the case of a set of N values {x1, x2, . . . , xN}, the average deviation
is computes using the following formula:
AvgDev =
1
N
N∑
i=1
|xi − µ| (4.3)
where µ refers to the mean signal strength.
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Skewness: This feature measures asymmetry around mean. For a set of
N values {x1, x2, . . . , xN}, the skewness is computed as:
γ1 =
1
N
(
N∑
i=1
(
xi − µ
σ
)3
)
(4.4)
where µ and σ respectively represents the mean and standard deviation of
signal strength.
Kurtosis: This feature measures the flatness or spikiness of a distribution.
For a set of N values {x1, x2, . . . , xN}, the kurtosis is computed as:
β1 =
1
N
(
N∑
i=1
(
xi − µ
σ
)4
)
(4.5)
where µ and σ respectively represents the mean and standard deviation of
signal strength.
Spectral Roughness: Spectral roughness computes the average of the
dissonance between all possible pairs of peaks in a spectrum [123, 124].
Spectral Flux: Spectral flux is a measure of how quickly the power spec-
trum of a signal changes. It is calculated by taking the average Euclidean
distance between the power spectrum of two contiguous frames [124].
Spectral Attack Time: This features computes the average rise time
to spectral attacks where spectral attacks are local maxima in the spec-
trum [124].
Spectral Attack Slope: This features computes the average slope to spec-
tral attacks where spectral attacks are local maxima in the spectrum [124].
4.4 Classification Algorithms and Evaluation Metrics
Let us briefly discuss the classification algorithms and evaluation metrics used
for fingerprinting smartphones before we proceed to the evaluation section.
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4.4.1 Classification Algorithms
Once we have features extracted from the sensor data, we use supervised
learning algorithms to identify the source sensor. Any supervised learning
classifier has two main phases: training phase and testing phase. During
training, features from all smartphones (i.e., labeled data) are used to train
the classifier. In the test phase, the classifier predicts the most probable
class for a given (unseen) feature vector. We evaluate the performance of the
following classifiers — Support Vector Machine (SVM), Naive-Bayes classi-
fier, Multiclass Decision Tree, k-Nearest Neighbor (k-NN), Quadratic Dis-
criminant Analysis classifier and Random Forest (MATLAB’s Treebagger
model [125]). In general, we found that ensemble based approaches like ran-
dom forest outperforms other classifiers. We report the maximum achievable
accuracies from these classifiers.
For training and testing the classifiers we randomly split the dataset in
such a way that 50% of data from each device goes to the training set while
the remaining 50% goes to the test set. To prevent any bias in the selection
of the training and testing set, we randomize the training and testing set 10
times and report the average F-score. We also compute the 95% confidence
interval, but we found it to be less than 1% in most cases and hence do not
report them in such cases. For analyzing and matching fingerprints we use a
desktop machine with an Intel i7-2600 3.4 GHz processor with 12 GiB RAM.
We found that the average time required to match a new fingerprint was
around 10–100 ms.
4.4.2 Evaluation Metrics
For evaluation metrics we use the same set of standard multiclass classifi-
cation metrics as described in Section 3.5.2. That is we first compute pre-
cision and recall, and then take the harmonic mean of precision and recall
to compute F-score. We use the F-score to report the effectiveness of our
fingerprinting approach.
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4.5 Experimental Setup
Our experimental setup consists of collecting data from both lab setting and
public setting. In the lab setting we collect data from lab phones in our
office. For the public setting we request participants to visit our web page
with their smartphone from wherever they desire.
4.5.1 Lab Setting
We kick off our data collection by gathering data from 30 lab phones. Ta-
ble 4.4 lists the distribution of the different smartphones from which we
collect sensor data.
Table 4.4: Types of lab phones used.
Maker Model Quantity
Apple
iPhone 5 4
iPhone 5s 3
Samsung
Nexus S 14
Galaxy S3 4
Galaxy S4 5
Total 30
For the lab setting we collect data under all three audio stimulations (as
described in Table 4.2). Also, data is collected for both when the device in
placed flat on top of a surface as well as when it is placed in the hand of the
user while sitting down.
4.5.2 Public Setting
Next, we expand our data collection process to cover real world public set-
tings. We invite people to voluntarily participate in our study. Participants
are asked to visit our web page and follow a few simple steps to provide us
with sensor data. We recruit participants through institutional mass email
and online social networks. We asked participants to provide data under
two settings: no-audio setting and the inaudible sine-wave setting (we avoid
the background song setting to make the experience less bothersome for the
user). Each setting collected sensor data for about one minute, requiring
a total of two minutes of participation. Over the course of two weeks, we
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received data from a total of 76 devices. However, some participants did
not follow all the steps and as a result we were able to use only 63 of the
76 submissions. Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of the different devices
that participated in our study.5 We can see from Figure 4.3 that our public
dataset covers a diverse set of smartphones covering majoring vendors like
Apple and Samsung.
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of participant device models.
4.5.3 Analytic Tools
To extract spectral features we use the following signal-analytic tools and
modules: MIRtoolbox [91] and Libxtract [126]. For feature selection we use
the FEAST toolbox [127]. Lastly, for classifiers we use MATLAB’s Machine
Learning Toolbox [125].
4.6 Feature Exploration
We perform feature exploration to determine if inclusion of too many fea-
tures worsens performance due to their varying accuracies and potentially
conflicting signatures. We, therefore, explore all the features and determine
5We used https://web.wurfl.io/ to obtain the make and model of a smartphone.
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the subset of features that optimize our fingerprinting accuracy. For tem-
poral features, no transformation of the data stream is required, but for
spectral features we first convert the non-equally spaced data stream into a
fixed-spaced data stream using cubic spline interpolation. We interpolate at
a sampling rate of 8 kHz.6 Then, we use MIRtoolbox and Libxtract to extract
spectral features. Once feature extraction is complete, we look at feature se-
lection where we explore different combinations of features to maximize our
fingerprinting accuracy. We use the FEAST toolbox [127] and utilize the
Joint Mutual Information criterion (JMI criterion is known to provide the
best tradeoff in terms of accuracy, stability, and flexibility with small data
samples [128]) for ranking the features.
Figure 4.4 shows the results of our feature exploration for the 30 lab smart-
phones. We see that when using only accelerometer data the F-score seems
to flatten after considering the top 10 features. For gyroscope data we see
that using all 75 features (25 per data stream) achieves the best result. And
finally when we combine both accelerometer and gyroscope features, we see
that the F-score plateaus after considering the top 70 features (from a total
of 100 features). Among these top 70 features we found that 21 of them
came from accelerometer features and the remaining 49 came from gyro-
scope features. In terms of the distribution between temporal and spectral
features, we found that spectral features dominated with 44 of the top 70
features being spectral features. We use this subset of features in all our later
evaluations.
4.7 Experimental Evaluations
In this setting we evaluate how well we can fingerprint smartphones using
onboard motion sensors. We will first look at fingerprinting smartphones
from our lab setting, followed by smartphones from our public setting and
finally we will look at fingerprinting all smartphones in our collection.
6Although up-sampling the signal from ∼100 Hz to 8 kHz does not increase the accu-
racy of the signal, it does make direct application of standard signal processing tools more
convenient.
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Figure 4.4: Exploring the number optimal features for different sensors.
a) For accelerometer using more than the top 10 features leads to
diminished returns, b) For gyroscope all 75 features contribute to obtaining
improved accuracy, c) For the combined sensor stream using more than 70
features leads to diminished returns.
4.7.1 Results from Lab Setting
First, we look at fingerprinting smartphones under lab setting to demonstrate
the basic viability of the attack. For this purpose we keep smartphones
stationary on top of a flat surface. Table 4.5 summarizes our results. We
see that we can almost correctly identify all 30 smartphones under all three
scenarios by combining accelerometer and gyroscope features. Even when
devices are kept in the hand of the user, we can successfully identify devices
with an F-score of greater than 93%. While the benefit of the background
audio stimulation is not clear from this table, we will later on show that
audio stimulation do in fact enhance fingerprinting accuracy in the presence
of countermeasure techniques like sensor calibration and data obfuscation
(more on this in Chapter 7). Overall these results indicate that it is indeed
possible to fingerprint smartphones through motion sensors.
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Table 4.5: Average F-score under lab setting.
Device
Stimulation
Avg. F-score (%)
Placed Accelerometer Gyroscope Accelerometer+Gyroscope
On Desk
No-audio 96 95 99
Sine 98 99 100
Song 93 98 100
In Hand
No-audio 88 83 93
Sine 88 94 98
Song 84 89 95
4.7.2 Results from Public Setting
Next, we apply our fingerprinting approach on the public dataset. Table 4.6
shows our findings. Compared to the results from our lab setting, we see a
slight decrease in F-score but even then we were able to obtain an F-score of
95%. Again, the benefit of the audio stimulation is not evident from these
results, however, their benefits will become more visible in the Chapter 7
when we discuss countermeasure techniques.
Table 4.6: Average F-score under public setting where smartphones are
kept on top of a desk.
Stimulation
Avg. F-score (%)
Accelerometer Gyroscope Accelerometer+Gyroscope
No-audio 86 87 95
Sine 85 87 92
4.7.3 Results from Combined Setting
Finally, we combine our lab data with the publicly collected data to give
us a combined dataset containing 93 different smartphones. We apply the
same set of evaluations on this combined dataset. Table 4.7 highlights our
findings. Again, we see that combining features from both sensors provides
the best result. In this case we obtained an F-score of 96%. All these results
suggest that smartphones can be successfully fingerprinted through motion
sensors.
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Table 4.7: Average F-score under both lab and public setting where
smartphones are kept on top of a desk.
Stimulation
Avg. F-score (%)
Accelerometer Gyroscope Accelerometer+Gyroscope
No-audio 85 89 96
Sine 89 89 95
4.8 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we will look at how robust our fingerprints are as we vary the
size of the device population and training set. We also study how our sensor
fingerprints react to temperature change. Finally, we investigate temporal
stability of motion sensors.
4.8.1 Impact of Device Number
We evaluate the accuracy of our classifier while varying the number of de-
vices. We pick a subset of n devices from our dataset and perform the
training and testing steps for this subset. For each value of n, we repeat
the experiment 10 times, using a different random subset of n devices each
time. In this experiment we only consider the use of both accelerometer and
gyroscope features, since they produce the best performance (as evident from
our previous results), and focus on the no-audio and sine wave background
scenarios. Figure 4.5 shows that the F-score generally decreases with large
number of devices, which is expected because an increased number of unique
labels makes classification more difficult. But even then scaling from 10 de-
vices to 93 devices the F-score decreases by only 4%. Extrapolating from
the graph, we expect classification to remain accurate even for significantly
larger datasets.
4.8.2 Impact of Training Set Size
We also consider how varying the training set size impacts the fingerprint-
ing accuracy. For this experiment we vary the ratio of training and testing
set size. For this experiment we only look at data from our lab setting as
many of the devices from our public setting did not have exactly 10 samples.
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Figure 4.5: Average F-score for different numbers of smartphones. F-score
generally tends to decrease slightly as more devices are considered.
We also consider the setting where there is no background audio stimulation
and use the combined features of accelerometer and gyroscope. Figure 4.6
shows our findings. While an increased training-set size improves classifi-
cation accuracy, even with mere two training samples (each consisting of
5–6 seconds worth of sensor data) we can achieve an F-score of 98%; with
increased training set sizes producing an F-score of over 99%.
4.8.3 Impact of Temperature
Here we analyze how temperature impacts the fingerprint of smartphone sen-
sors. For this purpose we collect sensor data under different temperatures.
We took one set of readings outside our office building on September 03, 2015
(with temperatures in the range of 91◦F to 93◦F ) while we took another set
of readings on October 9, 2015 (with temperatures in the range of 61◦F to
63◦F ). In both cases we also took readings inside the office where tempera-
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Figure 4.6: Average F-score for different ratio of training and testing
data. With only two training data we achieved an F-score of 98%.
ture was set to around 74◦F on the thermostat. As these set of experiments
were conducted at a later period of time compared to our other experiments,
we were only able to collect data from 17 smartphones (as described in Ta-
ble 4.8).7 Therefore, the results described in this section are in the context
of the smartphones specified in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8: Types of phones used for analyzing temperature effect.
Maker Model Quantity
Apple
iPhone 5 4
iPhone 5s 3
Samsung
Nexus S 3
Galaxy S3 2
Galaxy S4 5
Total 17
Table 4.9 summarizes our findings. We refer to September 03, 2015 as
a hot day and October 09, 2015 as a cold day. From Table 4.9 we see
that temperatures do lower F-score where warmer temperatures cause more
discrepancies in the generated fingerprints compared to colder temperatures
(as indicated by the red and blue blocks in the table).
7We only had access to these 17 smartphones at the time of conducting this experiment.
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Table 4.9: Impact of temperature on motion sensor fingerprinting.
Test (Avg. F-score in %)
No-audio
Inside (hot) Outside (hot) Inside (cold) Outside (cold)
Inside (hot) 100∗ 89 90 92
Outside (hot) 90 100∗ 81 75
Inside (cold) 89 77 100∗ 97Train
Outside (cold) 86 82 99 100∗
Test (Avg. F-score in %)
Sine wave
Inside (hot) Outside (hot) Inside (cold) Outside (cold)
Inside (hot) 100∗ 80 92 91
Outside (hot) 83 99∗ 82 72
Inside (cold) 88 72 100∗ 90Train
Outside(cold) 85 69 92 100∗
∗ 50% of the dataset is used for training and remaining 50% for testing
4.8.4 Temporal Stability
We now take a closer look at how the fingerprints evolve over time. For this
purpose we reuse data collected from Section 4.8.3. As we collected data
inside our lab in two different dates (one on September 03, 2015 and the
other on October 09, 2015) we can analyze how sensor fingerprints change
over time and how they impact our F-score. Table 4.10 summarizes our
findings. We see that over time fingerprints do change to some extent, but
even then we can achieve an F-score in the range of 88–92%.
Table 4.10: Fingerprinting sensors at different dates.
Test (Avg. F-score in %)
No-audio
Sept. 03, 2015 Oct. 09,2015
Sept. 03, 2015 100∗ 90
Train
Oct. 09,2015 89 100∗
Test (Avg. F-score in %)
Sine wave
Sept. 03, 2015 Oct. 09,2015
Sept. 03, 2015 100∗ 92
Train
Oct. 09,2015 88 100∗
∗ 50% of the dataset is used for training and remaining
50% for testing
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4.9 Summary
In this chapter, we show that motion sensors such as accelerometer and gy-
roscope can be used to uniquely identify smartphones. The more concerning
matter is that these sensors can be surreptitiously accessed by a web page
publisher without users’ awareness. We do, however, experiment with only
93 devices; a larger target device pool could lower our accuracy. In the next
chapter, we will look at how our fingerprinting approach scales with large
number of smartphones.
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CHAPTER 5
LARGE-SCALE MOTION SENSOR
FINGERPRINTING
In this chapter we extend our work on motion sensor fingerprinting for a large
pool of smartphones. We also develop a generic model to estimate prediction
accuracies for larger-scale user populations.
5.1 Overview
An important question that we want to address is whether our fingerprinting
approach can be effective at scale. To answer this question we first perform a
larger-scale evaluation of our approach by collecting motion sensor data from
a total of 610 devices. We rerun our classifications on this large dataset and
show that high classification accuracy is still feasible. We then use the data
we collected to develop a model to predict classification accuracies for even
larger datasets, by fitting a parametric distribution to model inter- and intra-
cluster distances. These distributions are then used to predict the accuracy
of a k-NN classifier, used with state-of-the-art distance metric learning tech-
niques. Our evaluation reveals that even with 100 000 devices an accuracy
of 10–16% can be achieved depending on training set size, which suggests
that motion sensor fingerprinting can be effective when combined with even
a weak browser fingerprint. Note that because k-NN underperforms other
classifiers, such as a random forest (or bagged trees), our estimate of accuracy
is quite conservative.
5.2 Data Collection
After our initial recruitment of users through institutional mass email and
social media like Facebook and Twitter (as described in Section 4.5.2), we
extend our data collection through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk [129]. Users
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are asked to visit our web page while placing their smartphone on a flat
surface. Thus, mimicking the scenario where the user has placed his/her
smartphone on a desk while browsing a web page. We only collect data for
the no-audio setting (as described in Table 4.2), so our web page collects 10
samples consecutively where each sample is 5–6 seconds worth of sensor data;
total participation time is in the range of 1 minute. In total, we had a total of
610 participants over a period of three months.1 We obtained data from 108
different brands (i.e., make and model) of smartphones with different models
of iPhone comprising nearly half of the total devices as shown in Appendix B.
Since some participation was voluntary for users not using Mechanical
Turk, we had many devices for which we had fewer than 10 samples. Fig-
ure 5.1 shows the distribution of the different number of samples per device.
Also, we received data from participants at various sampling rates ranging
from 20 Hz to 120 Hz. This maybe caused by various factors such as the cur-
rent battery life or the number of applications running in the background.
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of the number of data samples per smartphone.
1This 610 devices included 30 lab phones, 63 public phones and 517 Mechanical Turk
participant phones.
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5.3 Classification Algorithms and Metrics
Classification Algorithms: In Chapter 4 we saw that ensemble based
approaches such as random forest (i.e., bagged decision trees) out perform
other multiclass classifiers. We, therefore, only explore the performance of
the following two classifiers in this chapter: k -Nearest Neighbor (k -NN) and
random forest (MATLAB’s Treebagger model) [125].
Evaluation metrics: We use F-score (described in Section 3.5.2) to report
real world large-scale evaluation results. To evaluate large-scale simulation
results we use Accuracy as our evaluation metric.2 Accuracy is defined as
the portion of test traces that are correctly classified.
Accuracy, Acc =
# of samples correctly classified
Total test samples
(5.1)
5.4 Fingerprinting Large Number of Smartphones
We had a total of 610 participants in our data collection study. To evaluate
the performance of the classifiers, we first split our dataset into training and
testing set. As we have devices with different number of data samples (see
Figure 5.1), we evaluate F-score for different number of training samples. To
prevent any bias in the selection of training and testing set, we randomly
select training and testing samples and rerun our experiments 10 times to
report the average F-score.3 Table 5.1 summarizes the average F-score for
different number of training samples per device.
From Table 5.1 we see that we can achieve high classification accuracy
even for this larger dataset. With five training samples, which correspond
to about 25 seconds of data, accuracy is 86%, increasing to 90% with 9
training samples. Even with a single 5 seconds worth of data sample, we
can obtain 33% accuracy, which may be sufficient if a small amount of extra
information can be obtained through other browser fingerprinting techniques,
however weak.
2Accuracy can be thought of as a relaxed version of F-score.
3We also compute the 95% confidence interval for F-score, but we found it to be less
than 1% in most cases.
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Table 5.1: Average F-score for different size of training set.
Training Number Avg. F-score (%)
samples of Random
per device devices Forest∗
1 586 33
2 567 65
3 545 78
4 524 83
5 501 86
6 483 88
7 468 89
8 444 89
9 400 90
∗ 100 bagged decision trees
5.5 Large-Scale Simulation
Although we have shown that we can reliably fingerprint up to a few hundred
devices, in real world scenarios the fingerprinted population will be much
larger. It is not feasible for us to collect data on much larger datasets;
instead, we develop a model to predict how well a classifier will perform
as the number of devices grows. However, although random forest provides
the best classification performance, on our dataset, its operation is hard
to model, as different trees use a different random sample of features. We
therefore base our analysis on nearest-neighbor classifier (k-NN), which uses
a distance metric that we can model parametrically. Note that k-NN does not
perform as well as random forest; as a result, our estimates are a conservative
measure of the actual attainable classification accuracies.
5.5.1 Distance Metric Learning
The k-NN algorithm relies on a distance metric to identify neighboring points.
It is possible to compute simple Euclidean distance between feature vectors;
however, this is unlikely to yield optimal results as some features will tend
to dominate. Learning a better distance (or similarity) metric between data
points has received much attention in the field of machine learning, pattern
recognition and data mining for the past decade [130]. Handcrafting a good
distance metric for a specific problem is generally difficult and this has led
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to the emergence of metric learning. The goal of a distance metric learning
algorithm is to take advantage of prior information, in form of labels, to au-
tomatically learn a transformation for the input feature space. A particular
class of distance function that exhibits good generalization performance for
distance-based classifiers such as k -NN, is Mahalanobis metric learning [131].
The aim is to find a global, linear transformation of the feature space such
that relevant dimensions are emphasized while irrelevant ones are discarded.
The linear transformation performs arbitrary rotations and scalings to con-
form to the desired geometry. After projection, Euclidean distance between
data points is measured.
State-of-the-art Mahalanobis metric learning algorithms include Large Mar-
gin Nearest Neighbor (LMNN) [132], Information Theoretic Metric Learning
(ITML) [133] and Logistic Discriminant Metric Learning (LDML) [134]. A
brief description of these metric learning algorithms is provided by Ko¨stinger
et al. [131]. To understand how these metric learning algorithms improve the
performance k -NN classifier, we first plot the mutual information (MI) of
each feature before and after each transformation. Figure 5.2 shows the
amount of mutual information per feature under both untransformed and
transformed settings. Figure 5.2 shows a clear benefit of the distance met-
ric learning algorithms. All the transformations provide higher degree of
mutual information compared to the original untransformed data. Among
the three transformations we see that LDML on average provides slightly
higher amount mutual information per feature. Distribution of the top 12
features for both original and LDML-transformed feature space is provided
in Appendix A.
To show that LDML provides the best transformation on our dataset we
rerun the k -NN classifier on the transformed feature space. Table 5.2 high-
lights the average F-score for different metric learning algorithms. We see
that for our dataset, LDML seems to be the best choice. We, therefore, use
LDML algorithm to transform our feature space before applying k -NN for
the rest of this chapter.
However, even with LDML, k-NN generally underperforms random forest,
as seen in Table 5.3: our F -score drops from 78% to 50% with 3 training
samples and from 86% to 54% with 5 training samples. The only exception
occurs for one training sample where k-NN with LDML performs slightly
better than random forest.
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Figure 5.2: Comparing mutual information for different metric learning
algorithms. Mutual information per feature for (a) untransformed data (b)
LMNN transformation (c) ITML transformation, and (d) LDML
transformation.
Table 5.2: Performance of different metric learning algorithms.
Avg. F-score for k -NN∗
Untransformed LMNN ITML LDML
35 41 46 50
∗ k = 1 with 3 training samples per device
5.5.2 Intra- and Inter-Device Distance Modeling
To predict how k-NN will operate on larger datasets, we proceed to derive
a distribution for distances between samples from different devices (inter-
device), and a second distribution for distances between different samples
from the same device (intra-device), after applying the LDML transformation
to the feature space. Since each data sample is a point in an n-dimensional
feature space, we compute the Euclidean distance between any two data
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Table 5.3: Average F-score of k-NN after LDML.
Training Number Avg. F-score (%)
samples of
k -NN
∗
k -NN+LDML
∗ Random
per device devices Forest
+
1 586 24 38 33
2 567 31 43 65
3 545 35 50 78
4 524 36 52 83
5 501 38 54 86
6 483 38 54 88
7 468 38 53 89
8 444 37 52 89
9 400 35 50 90
∗ k = 1
+ 100 bagged decision trees
samples using the following equation:
d(p, q) =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(pi − qi)2 (5.2)
where p and q represent two feature vectors in an n-dimensional space de-
fined as follows, p = (p1, p2, ..., pn) and q = (q1, q2, ..., qn). We then group
distances between feature vectors from the same device into one class Cintra
and distances between feature vectors from different devices into another
class Cinter. Class Cintra and Cinter can be defined as follows:
Cintra = {x : x = d(p, q), p ∈ Di, q ∈ Di,∀i ∈ D}
Cinter = {x : x = d(p, q), p ∈ Di, q ∈ Dj, i 6= j,∀i, j ∈ D}
where D refers to the set of all devices; we consider only devices with at
least two training samples, we have 567 such devices. We can now fit an
individual distribution for each class. To do this we utilize MATLAB’s fitdist
function [135]. To avoid overfitting, we split our devices into four equal
subsets. We then fit and compare distributions from each subset. Figure 5.3
shows the top five estimated inter-device distance (Cinter) distributions for
each subset of devices. Here, the distributions are ranked based on Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) [136]. From Figure 5.3 we can see that the top
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five distributions are more or less consistent across all four subsets.
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Figure 5.3: Estimated inter-device distance distributions for 4 subsets of
devices where each subset contains 141 devices.
We see similar outcomes when we plot the intra-device distance (Cintra)
distributions. Figure 5.4 shows the top five estimated distributions for each
subset of devices. Again we can see that certain parametric distributions are
present across all four subsets.
Next, we plot the same inter-device distance distribution but this time
we consider data from all 567 devices. Figure 5.5(a) highlights the top five
distributions. Comparing Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.5(a), we see that the most
representative inter-device distance distribution is an Inverse Gaussian dis-
tribution. Similarly, we find that the most likely intra-device distance dis-
tribution (Cintra) is a Generalized extreme value distribution as shown in
Figure 5.5(b). Figure 5.5(c) shows the difference between intra- and inter-
device distance distribution.
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Figure 5.4: Estimated intra-device distance distributions for 4 subsets of
devices where each subset contains 141 devices.
5.5.3 Simulating k-NN for Large Number of Devices
Now that we have representative distributions for intra- and inter-device dis-
tance, we can simulate a k -NN classifier. The pseudo code for simulating
k -NN classifier is provided in Algorithm 2. The algorithm works as follows.
Let us assume that there are D devices and for each device we have N train-
ing samples. Now, for any given test sample, a k -NN classifier, first computes
N×D distances of which N distances are with samples from the same device
and N×(D − 1) distances are with all samples belonging to (D − 1) other
devices. We emulate these distances by drawing N and N×(D − 1) dis-
tances from our representative intra- and inter-device distance distributions,
respectively. k -NN classifier then inspects the class label for the k nearest
neighbors. We can emulate this step by sorting the distances and picking the
k lowest distances. Lastly, k -NN classifier outputs the class label with the
majority vote. To emulate this step we assign each distance a label of either
0 (meaning distance from same device) or 1 (meaning distance from different
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Figure 5.5: Estimated distributions for (a) inter-device distance (Cinter)
(b) intra-device distance (Cintra). (c) Difference between intra- and
inter-device distance distribution.
device). We then check if label-0 dominates over label-1, if so we count that
as a successful classification. This whole process repeats multiple times to
provide us with an average classification accuracy.
Next, we run our k -NN simulator for a large number of devices. Given
that we have our intra- and inter-device distance distributions (Distrintra
and Distrinter) we can simulate the fingerprinting accuracy for any number
of devices (D). The only two parameters that we need to explore are – the
number of training samples per device (N) and number of nearest neighbors
(k). Given that a user spends on average anywhere between 10 to 20 seconds
78
Algorithm 2 Simulating k -NN classifier.
Input: k, N , D, Distrintra, Distrinter, Runs
k – number of nearest neighbors (odd integer)
N – number of training samples per device
D – number of devices
Distrintra – intra-device distance distribution
Distrinter – inter-device distance distribution
Runs – number of runs
Output: Acc
Acc – Average classification accuracy
d← {} #list of (distance,label) tuple
Acc← 0
for i := 1 to Runs do
#add N intra-distances and label each with 0
for j := 1 to N do
d← d+ {(random(Distrintra), 0)}
end for
#add N×(D − 1) inter-distances and label each with 1
for j := 1 to N×(D − 1) do
d← d+ {(random(Distrinter), 1)}
end for
d← sort(d) #in ascending order of distance
l← label(d, k) #return label for top k elements
imposters← sum(l) #sum top k labels
if imposters < k/2 then
Acc← Acc+ 1 #correct decision
end if
end for
Acc← Acc/Runs
return Acc
on a web page [137, 138] values of N ≤ 5 seem most realistic (each of our
data sample is around 5 seconds worth of web session). We, therefore, vary
N from 2 to 5 in our experiments. Also, we explore all odd integer values
of k ≤ N (in practice a rule of thumb in machine learning is to limit k to
the square root of the size of the training set [139], i.e., 1 ≤ k ≤ √N).
Figure 5.6 shows how our simulation results compare with our real world
results for different values of N and k.
From Figure 5.6 we can see that as k increases the simulation results also
start to deviate from real world results. However, setting k = 1 provides the
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best overlap between real world and simulation results.4 Also, we can see
that for k = 1 the average classification accuracy is in the range of 10–16%
when we scale up to 100 000 devices. This accuracy is unlikely to be sufficient
if motion sensors are the unique source of a fingerprint, but it suggests that
combining motion sensor data with even a weak browser-based fingerprint is
likely to be effective at distinguishing users in large populations. Addition-
ally, these classification accuracies are conservative and potentially provide a
lower bound on performance, as random forests provide significantly better
performance.
5.6 Summary
We demonstrated that sensor fingerprinting is feasible on a much larger
scale than what we previously studied. We show that 90% accuracy can
be achieved for up to 400 devices, and at least 10–16% accuracy can be re-
alized with 100 000 devices, as predicted according to our model. While this
accuracy alone might not be sufficient to uniquely identify a smartphone but
combining our approach with any other browser-based fingerprints is likely
to provide sufficient discrimination among a large pool of smartphones.
4Differences between our k-NN model and the actual k-NN classifier on real data
arise from an imperfect fit of the distribution as well as the fact that our model makes
an assumption that intra- and inter-phone distances are identically and independently
distributed.
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Figure 5.6: Comparing real world results with simulation results.
Simulation results closely match real world results for k = 1.
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CHAPTER 6
USAGE PATTERNS OF MOTION
SENSORS IN THE WILD
In this chapter we look at how many of the top websites access motion
sensors. We also cluster the usage patterns into broad groups to determine
how motion sensors are being utilized in the web today.
6.1 Data Collection Framework
Figure 6.1 provides an overview of our methodology to automatically cap-
ture and cluster JavaScripts accessing motion sensor data through mobile
browsers. To automate this process, we use Selenium Web Driver [140] to
run an instance of Chrome browser with a user agent set for a smartphone
client. In order to collect unfolded JavaScripts, we attach a debugger be-
tween the V8 JavaScript engine [141] and the web page. Specifically, we
observe script.parsed function, which is invoked when new code is added
with <iframe> or <script> tag. We implement the debugger as a Chrome
extension and monitor all JavaScript snippets parsed on a web page. The
debugger collects script snippets that access sensor data, i.e., scripts that
invoke sensor APIs.
6.2 Feature Extraction
Once scripts are collected, we aim to cluster them into a broad groups to
identify their usage pattern. To analyze and quantify the similarity be-
tween JavaScript snippets, we parse them to produce Abstract Syntax Trees
(ASTs). ASTs have been used in prior literatures for JavaScript malware
detection [142]. ASTs allow us to retain the structural and logical proper-
ties of the code while ignoring fine details like variable names, which are not
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AST Parser 
(example: var answer = 6 *  7;)
ExpressionStatement
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Selenium Web Driver Chrome Browser
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Figure 6.1: Overview of our JavaScript analysis setup.
useful for our analysis. We use the Esprima JavaScript parser [143] to visu-
alize AST for each JavaScript snippet. We transform ASTs into normalized
node sequences by performing pre-order traversal on each tree. It should be
mentioned that we start parsing each AST from the point where sensor data
is first accessed. Each variable length sequence is composed of node types
that appear in the tree. Since there are 88 distinct node types in JavaScript
language, we transform the variable length normalized node sequences into
88-dimensional summary vectors. In other words, each JavaScript snippet
is represented as a point in a 88-dimensional space, where each dimension
corresponds to a node type. Finally, we attempt to perform unsupervised
clustering on these summary vectors (as shown in Figure 6.1).
6.3 Measurement Study Results
We provide real world results in terms of how many websites access motion
sensor data and also in terms of what are the main use cases for accessing
motion sensors.
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6.3.1 Websites Accessing Motion Sensors
We run our experiment for the top 100 000 Alexa websites [21]. Among these
websites we find that 1130 websites contain some form of JavaScript code
that accesses at least one of the motion sensors. It is worth mentioning that
a few of the scripts were downloaded from ad networks as the web pages
were loaded. Table 6.1 shows a breakdown of the detected websites into
their corresponding ranking groups. We see that majority (1022 out of the
1130) of our detected websites come from the top 10 000–100 000 websites.
However, even 6 of the top 100 websites seem to access motion sensors.
Table 6.1: Top websites accessing motion sensors.
Rank # of sites
1–100 6
101–1000 12
1001–10000 90
10001–100000 1022
6.3.2 Types of Usage for Motion Sensors
Our next goal is to cluster these 1130 websites into individual groups based
on their usage of sensor data, so that we can identify the major reasons
as to why websites access motion sensors. To cluster the JavaScript snip-
pets into a small number of groups we first perform feature reduction to
remove irrelevant features. Many of the 88 features had a value of zero for
all Javascript snippets, so we first throw out these features. This reduces
the size of the feature vector to 31. We then use the MATLAB Toolbox
provided by Laurens van der Maaten [144] to further map the features into a
low dimensional space. We find that Stochastic Proximity Embedding (SPE)
method [145] provides the best outcome in terms of both reducing dimen-
sionality and providing good clusters. Our final reduced feature space had
three dimensions. Figure 6.2 shows a scatter plot along the three dimensions
for all the JavaScripts. We can clearly see that the JavaScripts form clusters.
To determine the number of clusters that is a good fit for our data we
run k -means clustering algorithm [146] for different number of clusters and
perform Silhouette analysis [147]. Silhouette analysis can be used to study
the separation distance between the resulting clusters. Silhouette coefficient
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Figure 6.2: Scatter plot for JavaScript snippets accessing motion sensors
along reduced dimensions.
Table 6.2: Silhouette coefficient for different number of clusters.
Clusters 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Csilhouette 0.51 0.59 0.59 0.62 0.63 0.65 0.64 0.38
ranges from +1, indicating point are very distant from neighboring clusters,
through 0, indicating points are very close to the decision boundary between
two neighboring clusters, to -1, indicating points are probably assigned to
the wrong cluster. Table 6.2 summarizes the average silhouette coefficients
(Csilhouette) for different number of clusters. We see that silhouette coefficient
peaks for 8 clusters. The corresponding silhouette plot for 8 clusters in given
in Figure 6.3. We see that on average samples in cluster 1,2,4,6 and 7 have
silhouette coefficient value greater than 0.6 while the samples in cluster 3,5
and 8 have silhouette coefficient close to 0.5. We also see some samples
with negative silhouette coefficients and this is likely caused by JavaScripts
reusing code snippets belonging to different libraries. Here, our goal is not to
generate a perfect clustering of all the JavaScripts rather to broadly cluster
them to identify the major usage patterns for accessing motion sensors.
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Figure 6.3: Silhouette plot for the estimated 8 clusters.
Once we have the general clusters, we then go back to the JavaScripts to
understand their usage of motion sensor data. This part of the analysis was
carried out manually. However, since we generated 8 clusters we randomly
sampled multiple JavaScripts from each cluster to verify if they were per-
forming similar functionality with the sensor data.1 We were able to identify
8 generic use cases for the motion sensors. Table 6.3 and 6.4 summarizes
our findings. We see that majority of the detected scripts periodically send
sensor data to some third party sites. We were not able to pinpoint the exact
use case for sending motion sensor data to third party sites as we did not
have access to third party code. The next big usage for motion sensor data is
that they are used in generating random numbers. Other use cases include —
parallax viewing, gesture detection, motion captcha, specific ad generation
and orientation detection. We were not able to concretely identify the use
case for cluster 3 as we found that it contains multiple scripts all performing
different tasks; some were doing touch analytics using accelerometer to de-
tect tilt while others were doing something similar to parallax scrolling. We
intend to perform a more thorough in-depth analysis of this usage patterns
in the future.
1We randomly sampled around 15 JavaScripts per cluster.
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Table 6.3: Generic use cases for accessing motion sensor data.
Cluster # % of scripts Use Case
6 40.5 Transmit sensor data
4 16.6 Random number generator
8 9.7 Detect device orientation
5 8.9 Parallax scrolling/viewing
2 7.1 Gesture detections
1 7.0 Motion captcha
3 6.0 Miscellaneous
7 4.2 Specific Ad generation
Table 6.4: Description of use cases for accessing motion sensor data.
Clus. # Use Case Description
6 Periodically sends motion sensor data to third party sites (can be marked suspicious)
4 Crypto libraries use sensor data to add entropy to random numbers [148]
8 Detects device orientation periodically to readjust components in the website
5 Parallax Engine that reacts to the orientation of a smart device [149]
2 A jQuery plug-in for gesture events such as ‘pinch’, ‘rotate’, ‘swipe’, ‘tap’ and ‘shake’ [150]
1 A jQuery CAPTCHA plug-in based on the HTML5 Canvas element [151]
3 We were not able to point the exact use case for this cluster.
7 Checks to see if accelerometer is present so that certain ad URLs can be requested
6.4 Summary
Our measurement study reveals that motion sensors are already being used
by over 1% of the top 100 000 websites, and distressingly, sensor data is often
sent to servers for storage and analysis, which could serve as a vehicle for
fingerprinting. Thus, we can conclude that motion sensor fingerprinting is a
realistic threat to mobile users’ privacy.
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CHAPTER 7
COUNTERMEASURES FOR MOTION
SENSOR FINGERPRINTING
Up until now we have focused on showing how easy it is to fingerprint smart-
phones through onboard sensors. We now shift our focus on providing a
systematic approach to defend against such fingerprinting techniques. Ac-
cessing the microphone requires explicit user permission; moreover, users are
aware of the obvious privacy threats associated with providing access to mi-
crophone. We, therefore, feel promoting general awareness about not giving
applications and/or websites access to microphone, unless it is deemed really
useful, seems to be the most practical line of defense against fingerprinting
smartphones through acoustic side-channels.
In this chapter, we only focus on developing countermeasures for finger-
printing motion sensors like accelerometers and gyroscopes as accessing them
does not require any explicit user permission. In the absence of explicit user
permission websites can surreptitiously access the motion sensors without
interfering with the user’s browsing experience. As a result users might
not be aware that websites maybe fingerprinting their smartphones in the
background while they are browsing certain web pages. Such surreptitious
nature poses a greater threat to user privacy. We start off by investigating
the following three countermeasure techniques: sensor calibration and data
obfuscation and sensor quantization. We first study the effectiveness of the
countermeasures in lowering fingerprinting accuracy and then study how such
mitigation techniques impact the utility of the motion sensors.
7.1 Sensor Calibration
Bojinov et al. [73] observe that accelerometers have calibration errors, and
use these calibration differences as a mechanism to distinguish between them.
In particular, they consider an affine error model: aM = g · a + o, where
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a is the true acceleration along an axis and aM is the measured value of
the sensor. The two error parameters are the offset o (bias away from 0)
and the gain g which magnifies or diminishes the acceleration value. Our
classification uses many features, but we find that the mean signal value
is the most discriminating feature for each of the sensor streams, which is
closely related to the offset. We therefore explore whether calibrating the
sensors will make them more difficult to fingerprint. Note that calibration
has a side effect of improving the accuracy of sensor readings and is therefore
of independent value. We perform calibration only on the sensors in our lab
phones (30 smartphones as described in Table 4.4) because we felt that the
calibration process is too time consuming for the volunteers.1 Moreover, we
could better control the quality of the calibration process when carried out
in the lab.
First, let us briefly describe the sensor coordinate system where the sensor
framework uses a standard 3-axis coordinate system to express data values.
For most sensors, the coordinate system is defined relative to the device’s
screen when the device is held in its default orientation (shown in Figure 7.1).
When the device is held in its default orientation, the positive x-axis is
horizontal and points to the right, the positive y-axis is vertical and points
up, and the positive z-axis points toward the outside of the screen face.2 We
compute offset and gain error in all three axes.
7.1.1 Calibrating Accelerometers
Considering both offset and gain error, the measured output of the accelerom-
eter (aM = [aMx , a
M
y , a
M
z ]) can be expressed as: a
M
x
aMy
aMz
 =
 OxOy
Oz
+
Sx 0 00 Sy 0
0 0 Sz

 axay
az
 (7.1)
where S = [Sx, Sy, Sz] and O = [Ox, Oy, Oz] respectively represents the gain
and offset errors along all three axes (a = [ax, ay, az] refers to the actual
1Requiring around 12 minutes in total for calibrating both the accelerometer and
gyroscope.
2Android and iOS consider the positive and negative direction along an axis differently.
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Figure 7.1: Calibrating accelerometer along three axes. We collect
measurements along all 6 directions (±x,±y,±z).
acceleration). In the ideal world [Sx, Sy, Sz] = [1, 1, 1] and [Ox, Oy, Oz] =
[0, 0, 0], but in reality they differ from the desired values. To compute the
offset and gain error of an axis, we need data along both the positive and
negative direction of that axis (one measures positive +g while the other
measures negative −g). In other words, six different static positions are used
where in each position one of the axes is aligned either along or opposite to
earth’s gravity. This causes a = [ax, ay, az] vector to take one of the following
six possible values {[±g, 0, 0], [0,±g, 0], [0, 0,±g]}. For example, if aMz+ and
aMz− are two values of accelerometer reading along the positive and negative
z-axis, then we can compute the offset (Oz) and gain (Sz) error using the
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following equations:
Sz =
aMz+ − aMz−
2g
, Oz =
aMz+ + a
M
z−
2
(7.2)
We take 10 measurements along all six directions (±x,±y,±z) from all our
lab devices as shown in Figure 7.1. From these measurements we compute
the average offset and gain error along all three axes using equation (7.2).
Figure 7.2 shows a scatter-plot of the errors along z− axis for 30 smart-
phones (each color code represents a certain make and model). We can see
that the devices are scattered around all over the plot which signifies that
different devices have different amount of offset and gain error. Such unique
distinction makes fingerprinting feasible.
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Figure 7.2: Accelerometer offset and gain error from 30 smartphones.
7.1.2 Calibrating Gyroscopes
Calibrating gyroscope is a harder problem as we need to induce a fixed an-
gular change to determine the gain error even though the offset error can
be computed while keeping the device stationary.3 Similar to accelerom-
eter we can also represent the measured output of the gyroscope (ωM =
3However, we found that a gyroscope’s offset was impacted by orientation.
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[ωMx , ω
M
y , ω
M
z ]) using the following equation: ω
M
x
ωMy
ωMz
 =
 OxOy
Oz
+
Sx 0 00 Sy 0
0 0 Sz

 ωxωy
ωz
 (7.3)
where again S = [Sx, Sy, Sz] and O = [Ox, Oy, Oz] respectively represents the
gain and offset errors along all three axes. Here, ω = [ωx, ωy, ωz] represents
the ideal/actual angular velocity. Ideally all gain and offset errors should
be equal to 1 and 0 respectively. But in the real world when the device is
rotated by a fixed amount of angle, the measured angle tends to deviate from
the actual angular displacement (shown in Figure 7.3(a)). This impacts any
system that uses gyroscope for angular-displacement measurements.
α
α
Smartphoneα
Actual rotation = α
Measured rotation =
Smartphone
180 o
(a) (b)
Figure 7.3: a) Offset and gain error in gyroscope impact systems that use
them for angular-displacement measurements, b) Calibrating the gyroscope
by rotating the device 180◦ in the positive x-axis direction.
To calibrate gyroscope we again need to collect data along all six different
directions (±x,±y,±z) individually, but this time instead of keeping the
device stationary we need to rotate the device by a fixed amount of angle
(θ). In our setting, we set θ = 180◦ (or pi rad). For example, Figure 7.3(b)
shows how we rotate the smartphone by 180◦ around the positive x-axis. The
angular displacement along any direction can be computed from gyroscope
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data in the following manner:
ωMi = Oi + Siω, i ∈ {±x,±y,±z}∫ t
0
ωMi dt =
∫ t
0
Oi dt+ Si
∫ t
0
ω dt
θMi = Oit+ Siθ (7.4)
where t refers to the time it takes to rotate the device by θ angle with a fixed
angular velocity of ω. Now, for any two measurements along the opposite
directions of an axis we can compute the offset and gain error using the
following equations:
Oi =
θMi+ + θ
M
i−
t1 + t2
, Si =
θMi+ − θMi− −Oi(t1 − t2)
2pi
(7.5)
where i ∈ {x, y, z} and t1 and t2 represents the timespan of the positive
and negative measurement respectively. We take 10 measurements along all
six directions (±x,±y,±z) and compute the average offset and gain error
along all three axes. However, since it is practically impossible to manually
rotate the device at a fixed angular velocity, the integration in equation
(7.4) will introduce noise and therefore, the calculated errors will at best be
approximations of the real errors. We also approximate the integral using
trapezoidal rule [152] which will introduce more error.
We next visualize the offset and gain errors obtained from the gyroscopes of
30 smartphones (only showing for z− axis where each color code represents
a certain make and model). Figure 7.4 shows our findings. We see similar
result compared to accelerometers where devices are scattered around at
different regions of the plot. This suggests that gyroscopes exhibit different
range of offset and gain error across different units.
7.1.3 Fingerprinting Calibrated Data
In this section we look at how calibrating sensors impact fingerprinting accu-
racy. For this setting, we first correct the raw values by removing the offset
and gain errors before extracting features from them. That is, the calibrated
value aC = (aM − o)/g. We then generate fingerprints on the corrected data
and train the classifiers on the new fingerprints. Table 7.1 shows the average
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Figure 7.4: Gyroscope offset and gain error from 30 smartphones.
F-score for calibrated data under three scenarios (described in Table 4.2),
considering both cases where the devices were kept on top of a desk and in
the hand of a user. When we compare the results from uncalibrated data
(Table 4.5) to those from calibrated data, we see that the F-score reduces by
approximately 16–25% for accelerometer data but not as much for the gyro-
scope data. This suggests that we were able to calibrate the accelerometer
much more precisely than the gyroscope, as expected given the more complex
and error-prone manual calibration procedure for the gyroscope. Another in-
teresting observation is that audio stimulation provides small improvement
in classifier accuracy. This suggests that audio stimulation does not influence
the dominant features removed by the calibration, but does significantly im-
pact secondary features that come into play once calibration is carried out.
Overall, our results demonstrate that calibration is a promising technique,
especially if more precise measurements can be made. Manufacturers should
be encouraged to perform better calibration to both improve the accuracy of
their sensors and to help protect users’ privacy.
7.2 Data Obfuscation
Rather than removing calibration errors, we can instead add extra noise to
hide the miscalibration. This approach has the advantage of not requiring a
calibration step, which requires user intervention and is particularly difficult
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Table 7.1: Average F-score for calibrated data under lab setting.
Device
Stimulation
Avg. F-score (%)
Placed Accelerometer Gyroscope Accelerometer+Gyroscope
On Desk
No-audio 71 97 97
Sine 75 98 98
Song 77 99 99
In Hand
No-audio 69 85 91
Sine 70 90 93
Song 69 89 93
for the gyroscope sensor. As such, the obfuscation technique could be de-
ployed with an operating system update. Obfuscation, however, adds extra
noise and can therefore negatively impact the utility of the sensors (in con-
trast to calibration, which improves their utility). We explore the following
techniques for adding noise –
• Uniform noise: highest entropy while having a bound.
• Laplace noise: highest entropy which is inspired by Differential Pri-
vacy [153, 154].
• White noise: affecting all aspects of a signal.
7.2.1 Uniform Noise
In this section we randomly choose offset and gain errors from a uniform
range where we deduce the base ranges from our lab phones. We consider
three variations of adding uniform noise to sensor data.
Basic Obfuscation: First, we consider small obfuscation values in the
range that is similar to what we observed in the calibration errors in the pre-
vious section. Adding noise in this range is roughly equivalent to switching to
a differently (mis)calibrated phone and therefore should cause minimal im-
pact to the user. To add obfuscation noise, we compute aO = aM × gO + oO,
where gO and oO are the obfuscation gain and offset, respectively. Based
on Figures 7.2 and 7.4, we choose a range of [-0.5,0.5] for the accelerometer
offset, [-0.1,0.1] for the gyroscope offset, and [0.95,1.05] for the gain. For each
session, we pick uniformly random obfuscation gain and offset values from
the range; by varying the obfuscation values we make it difficult to fingerprint
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repeated visits. Table 7.2 summarizes our findings when we apply obfusca-
tion to all the sensor data obtained from our 30 lab smartphones. Compared
to unaltered data (Table 4.5), data obfuscation seems to provide significant
improvement in terms of reducing the average F-score. Depending on the
type of audio stimulation, F-score reduces by almost 7–24% when smart-
phones are kept stationary on the desk and by 23–42% when smartphones
are kept stationary in the hand of the user. The impact of audio stimulation
in fingerprinting motion sensors is much more visible in these results. We
see that F-score increases by almost 18–21% when a song is being played in
the background (compared to the no-audio scenario); again, we expect this
to be a consequence of audio-stimulation significantly impacting secondary
features that come into play once primary features are obfuscated.
Table 7.2: Average F-score for obfuscated data under lab setting.
Device
Stimulation
Avg. F-score (%)
Placed Accelerometer Gyroscope Accelerometer+Gyroscope
On Desk
No-audio 43 73 75
Sine 49 76 76
Song 71 88 93
In Hand
No-audio 46 46 51
Sine 42 49 57
Song 55 63 72
Next, we apply similar techniques to the public (see Section 4.5.2 for more
detail) and combined dataset (combining data from sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2).
We apply the same range of offset and gain errors to the raw sensor values
before generating fingerprints. Table 7.3 and Table 7.4 summarizes our re-
sults for both presence and absence of audio stimulation. We see that F-score
reduces by approximately 20–41% (compared to Table 4.6 and Table 4.7).
We expect one of the reasons for the lower accuracy is the usage of a larger
dataset, suggesting that for even larger datasets the impact of obfuscation is
likely to be even more pronounced. In Section 7.5 we analyze the impact of
obfuscation on a larger dataset.
Increasing Obfuscation Range: We now look at how the fingerprinting
technique reacts to different ranges of obfuscation. Starting with our base
ranges of [−0.5, 0.5] and [−0.1, 0.1] for the accelerometer and gyroscope off-
sets, respectively, and [0.95, 1.05] for the gain, we linearly scale the ranges
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Table 7.3: Average F-score for obfuscated data under public setting (63
phones) where smartphones were kept on top of a desk.
Stimulation
Avg. F-score (%)
Accelerometer Gyroscope Accelerometer+Gyroscope
No-audio 27 52 57
Sine 40 65 66
Table 7.4: Average F-score for obfuscated data under both lab and public
setting (93 phones) where smartphones were kept on top of a desk.
Stimulation
Avg. F-score (%)
Accelerometer Gyroscope Accelerometer+Gyroscope
No-audio 26 50 55
Sine 41 69 75
and observe the impact on F-score. We scale all ranges by the same amount,
increasing the ranges symmetrically on both sides of the interval midpoint.
For this experimental setup we only consider the combined dataset as
this contains the most number of devices (93 in total). We also restrict
ourselves to the setting where we combine both the accelerometer and gyro-
scope features because this provides the best result (as evident from all our
past results). Figure 7.5 highlights our findings. As we can see increasing
the obfuscation range does reduce F-score but it has a diminishing return.
For 10x increment, the F-score drops down to approximately 40% and 55%
for no-audio and audio stimulation respectively. Beyond 10x increment (not
shown) the reduction in F-score is minimal (at most 10% reduction at 50x
increment). This result suggests that simply obfuscating the raw values is
not sufficient to hide all unique characteristics of the sensors. So far we have
only manipulated the signal value but did not alter any of the frequency fea-
tures and as a result the classifier is still able to utilize the spectral features
to uniquely distinguish individual devices.
Enhanced Obfuscation: Given that we know that the spectral features
are not impacted by our obfuscation techniques, we now focus on adding
noise to the frequency of the sensor signal. Our data injection procedure
is described in Algorithm 3. The main idea is to probabilistically insert a
modified version of the current data point in between the past and current
timestamp where the timestamp itself is randomly selected. Doing so will
influence cubic interpolation of the data stream which in turn will impact
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Figure 7.5: Impact of obfuscation range as the range is linearly scaled up
from 1x to 10x of the base range.
the spectral features extracted from the data stream.
Algorithm 3 Obfuscated Data Injection.
Input: Time series Data (D,T ), Probability Pr, Offset O,
Gain G, Offset Range Orange, Gain Range Grange
Output: Modified time series Data (MD,MT )
offset ← Null
gain← Null
# Random(range) : randomly selects a value in range
j ← 1
for i = 1 to length(D) do
#New data insertion
if i > 1 and Random([0, 1]) < Pr then
offset ← Random(Orange)
gain← Random(Grange)
MT [j]← Random([T [i],MT [j − 1])
MD[j]← D[i]× gain + offset
j ← j + 1
end if
#Original Data
MD[j]← (D[i]×G+O
MT [j]← T [i]
j ← j + 1
end for
return (MD,MT )
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To evaluate our approach we first fix an obfuscation range. We choose
10x of the base range from the previous section as our fixed obfuscation
range. We then vary the probability of data injection from [0,1]. Figure 7.6
shows our findings. We can see that even with relatively small amount of
data injection (in the order of 20–40%) we can reduce the average F-score
to approximately 15–20% depending on the type of background stimulation
applied.
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Figure 7.6: Impact of randomly inserting new data points.
7.2.2 Laplace Noise
Next, we adopted an approach inspired by differential privacy [153, 154]
where we randomly selected offset and gain error from a Laplace distribution.
From the definition of differential privacy [153], we know that a randomized
function K gives -differential privacy if for all datasets D1 and D2 differing
on at most one element, and all S ⊆ Range(K),
Pr[K(D1) ∈ S] ≤ e Pr[K(D2) ∈ S] (7.6)
We can remap this setting into our own problem where we can think of each
device as a single dataset, and K as the process of selecting random offset
and gain error. S then becomes the outcome of applying random noise to raw
sensor data. By changing  we can control to what extent two device-output
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distributions are alike. If we assume all features are affected by changing
only the offset and gain errors along all three axes for both accelerometer
and gyroscope then the probability of a randomly drawn sample belonging
to a particular device (P ) can be approximated as below:
P + (D − 1)× P ′ = 1
P + (D − 1)× P/e ≤ 1
P (D − 1 + e) ≤ e
P ≤ e

D − 1 + e (7.7)
where D refers to the total number of devices and P ′ refers to the probability
of a randomly drawn sample belonging to any other device. We can think of
P as the probability of correct classification. Figure 7.7 shows how the upper
bound of the probability of correct classification varies for different values of
 (setting D = 93 as we had 93 devices). We can see that as we increase the
privacy budget, the maximum attainable correct classification also increases.
This is excepted because increasing  means the probability distributions
from different devices vary more from each other which potentially increases
the chance for distinguishing devices.
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
P
ro
b
. 
o
f 
co
rr
ec
t 
cl
as
si
fi
ca
ti
o
n
Privacy Budget (ε)
Figure 7.7: Approximation of the probability of correct classification
under differential privacy approach where noise is modeled through only
offset and gain errors along all three axes for both accelerometer and
gyroscope.
In our setting we have offset and gain errors along 6 axes (xyz -axes for
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both accelerometer and gyroscope), giving us a total of 12 dimensions. We
equally distribute our privacy budget  along all 12 dimensions and select
noise along the i − th dimension using the following Laplace distribution:
Lap(0, βi) where βi = Si/(/12) and Si = max(i− th Dimensional values)−
min(i−th Dimensional values), i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 12}. Figure 7.8 shows that as we
increase  (i.e., as we lower the scale parameter of the Laplace distribution),
F-score also increases. But even with a relatively high privacy budget of
 = 10 we see that F-score reduces from around 96% to 47–65% depending
on the type of background stimulation we apply. Interestingly, if we compare
Figure 7.8 with Figure 7.7 we can see that the upper bound for classification
accuracy holds for all  ≥ 4 but not for lower values of  (i.e.,  < 4). This
suggests that assuming all features are influenced by only changing the offset
and gain errors along 6 axes does not hold and there are certain features that
are unaffected by any change in offset and gain errors.
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Figure 7.8: Impact of randomly selecting offset and gain error from a
Laplace distribution inspired by differential privacy.
7.2.3 White Noise
From Figure 7.8 we see that even when  = 1 we can still achieve an F-score
of 26–41%. We looked at the dominant features after applying random off-
set and gain error, and found that spectral features like spectral irregularity,
spectral attack slope and spectral entropy are the top features in terms of
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mutual information. This is understandable because changing the offset and
gain have minimal impact on spectral features; we therefore next add Gaus-
sian white noise to the signal after applying random offset and gain error
from a Laplace distribution. For this experimental setup we fixed  = 6 (as
this provides at least 0.5 privacy budget along all dimensions) and varied
the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) from 0.5 to 10. Figure 7.9 highlights F-scores
for different values of SNRs. We can see that F-score drops from 40–55%
to 20–30% when Gaussian white noise is added to the signal for  = 6 and
SNR= 10. For lower SNR we see that the F-score reduces even further but
that comes at the cost to mixing a large amount of noise to the original signal
which could adversely affect the utility of the motion sensors as we will in
Section 7.4.
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Figure 7.9: Impact of Gaussian white noise on F-score.
7.3 Sensor Quantization
The basic idea behind quantization is that human brain cannot discriminate
minute changes in angle or magnitude. As a result if the raw values of a
sensor are altered slightly, it should not adversely impact the functionality
of the sensor. We perform quantization in the polar coordinate system as it
is easy to perceive (shown in Figure 7.10).
So, our first task is to covert the accelerometer data into its equivalent
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Figure 7.10: Convertion from Cartesian coordinate system (x, y, z) to
Polar coordinate system (r, θ, φ).
polar vector form as shown below:
radius, r =
√
a2x + a
2
y + a
2
z
inclination, θ = cos−1
az
r
azimuth, ψ = tan−1
ay
ax
where < ax, ay, az > represent the accelerometer data in the Cartesian coor-
dinate system. Since gyroscope provides rotational rate in rads−1, we do not
perform any conversion for gyroscope data. Next we pass our sensor data
through the following quantization function:
function quatization(val,type,bin_size){
// val: raw sensor value
// type: data type (angle or magnitude)
// bin_size: quantization size
return round(val/bin_size)*bin_size;
}
For angle related data (θ,ψ and gyroscope data) we set binsize = 6
◦ while
for magnitude (i.e., radius) we set binsize = 1 ms
−2. In other words, we place
angles into 6 degree bins and for accelerometer magnitude we map it to the
nearest integer. After performing quantization on the accelerometer data, we
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remap it to the Cartesian coordinate system using the following equations:
ax = r sin θ cosψ
ay = r sin θ sinψ
az = r cos θ
7.3.1 Fingerprinting Quantized Data
We now evaluate how quantization defends against sensor fingerprinting. Fig-
ure 7.11 summarizes our findings for the no-audio setting where the devices
are kept on top a desk while browsing our web page. We see that compared
to original raw data (Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7) F-score reduces by 32% for
lab setting and around 50% for public and combined setting. Compared to
basic obfuscation (Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4) we see that quantization performs
slightly better in lowering F-score. Quantization method has similar out-
comes to Laplace noise when  is set to 10 (see Figure 7.8 for more details).
However, we see that quantization is not as effective as enhanced obfusca-
tion (comparing with Figure 7.6) or white noise (comparing with Figure 7.9)
in lowering F-score. This is understandable because quantization does not
affect any of the spectral properties of the signal, whereas both enhanced
obfuscation and white noise alter spectral properties of the signal.
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Figure 7.11: Impact of sensor quantization on F-score.
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7.4 Determining Feasible Countermeasures
In the previous section we explored many possible countermeasures and
showed that all the countermeasures are effective in lowering fingerprint-
ing accuracy. However, as there are many legitimate application of motion
sensors we would like to deploy a countermeasure that has negligible impact
on the utility of the motion sensors. We, therefore, first explore how our
countermeasures impact the utility of a simple yet popular accelerometer-
based application known as Step Counter [155] (also known as Pedometer)
that uses accelerometer readings to determine the number of steps taken by
a user. Such analysis will enable us to shortlist the countermeasures that can
be readily deployed without impacting the utility of the motion sensors. To
carry out this analysis we prototype a Step Counter application where we
use a web page to collect sensor data. In our experimental setting, we ask
the participant to take 20 steps while holding the phone in his/her hand and
this whole process in repeated 10 times.
To get an understanding of how the different countermeasure streams look
we plot the magnitude of the accelerometer for the first three seconds in
Figure 7.12. We can see from the figure that certain mitigation techniques
such as Enhanced obfuscation and White noise disrupt the original signal
significantly. We will later on see that these two schemes have significant
adverse effect on the utility of the motion sensors. If we remove these two
schemes the plot clears up as shown in Figure 7.13. We can see that all the
renaming schemes retain the structural properties of the original signal and
thus should not significantly impact the utility of the motion sensors.
To quantitatively analysis the impact of the different countermeasures we
replay the step motion data 100 times under each countermeasure scheme and
compute the average number of steps taken by the user. Table 7.5 highlights
our findings for different forms of countermeasures. In the following sections
we briefly discuss how each countermeasure scheme impacts the utility of the
motion sensors in detail.
7.4.1 Utility under Calibration
From Table 7.5 we see that calibration does not have a significant effect on
accuracy. In general, we would expect calibration to improve accuracy but
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Figure 7.12: Accelerometer magnitude for different mitigation schemes.
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Figure 7.13: Accelerometer magnitude after removing disruptive
countermeasures.
our calibration process is imperfect (manually done) and it is possible that
it introduces very minor errors.
7.4.2 Utility under Obfuscation
Impact of Uniform Noise on Utility: Basic obfuscation introduces
errors that are commensurate with calibration errors of actual devices and
thus also has minimal impact on accuracy. Increasing the obfuscation range
introduces errors that are still within acceptable range. However, introducing
new data points makes the accelerometer readings significantly less reliable,
and we observe this effect in the computed step counts.
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Table 7.5: Privacy vs. Utility tradeoff for different countermeasures.
Stream Type
Step Count Avg.
Mean Std. Deviation F-score (%)
Original Stream 20 0 96a
Calibrated Stream 20.1 0.3 97b
Obfuscated Stream
Basic Obfuscationc 20.1 0.6 55a
Increased-Range Obfuscationd 20.6 1.4 40a
Enhanced Obfuscatione 42.9 15.1 15a
Laplace Noisef 20.5 1.1 40a
White Noiseg 73.9 9.1 20a
Quantized Streamh 20.4 0.7 46a
a For 93 devices
b For 30 lab phone
c Base range: offset = [−0.5, 0.5], gain = [0.95, 1.05]
d 10x of base range e 10x of base range with 0.4 injection probability
f For  = 6.0
g For  = 6.0 and SNR = 5
h Angles quantized to 6◦ bins and magnitudes rounded to the nearest integer
Impact of Laplace Noise on Utility: We rerun our step counter appli-
cation on sensor data where we select offset and gain error from a Laplace
distribution while varying . Figure 7.14 shows how step count evolves for
different levels of privacy budget (). We see that as we increase , step
count converges to the expected value with negligible deviation. For  ≥ 6
the confidence interval is negligible, i.e., for  ≥ 6 the impact of noise is
minimal. Notably, on Figure 7.8, we can see that for  = 6, we get signifi-
cantly lower classification accuracy than using low levels of uniform noise (see
Figure 7.5). This suggests that Laplace noise may achieve a better tradeoff
between privacy and utility; however, from Table 7.5 we see that Laplace
noise performs slightly worse (slightly higher standard deviation) compared
to basic obfuscation and quantization.
Impact of White Noise on Utility: Given that we see adding white
noise provides low F-scores we wanted to see what kind on impact it would
have on sensor utility. To evaluate this we rerun our step counter application
on sensor data after applying Gaussian white noise. Figure 7.15 highlights
the computed step counts for different SNRs. We see that adding white
noise has drastic consequences as it increases the number of steps counted
significantly, even at high signal-to-noise ratios.
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Figure 7.14: Impact of Laplace noise on utility.
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Figure 7.15: Impact of Gaussian white noise on sensor utility.
7.4.3 Utility under Quantization
From Table 7.5 we see that quantization has minimal impact on the utility
of the step counter. This suggests even if we quantize the sensor data into
bigger bins we can still obtain acceptable utility from the motion sensors.
Thus, a simple yet effective defense against sensor fingerprinting is to lower
the resolution of motion sensors.
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7.4.4 Deployment Considerations
We envision our obfuscation technique as an update to the mobile operating
system. From Table 7.5 we see that calibration represents one side of the
tradeoff spectrum with high utility but low privacy; enhanced obfuscation
and white noise provide the opposite side of the spectrum with low utility
and high privacy. The remaining four techniques provide better tradeoff
between privacy and utility. However, we see that basic obfuscation and
quantization provide slightly better utility (i.e., closer to real mean with
smaller standard deviation) compared to Laplace noise and increased-range
obfuscation. Due to limited budget (both in terms of participation time and
reward money) we give more emphasis on basic obfuscation and quantization
in the following sections to conduct a large-scale user study under a more
realistic web setting.
7.5 Effectiveness of Countermeasures at Large-Scale
Given that we have identified that basic obfuscation and quantization have
minimal impact on the utility of the motion sensors, we now want to verify
their effectiveness against fingerprinting large-scale smartphones in a real
world setting. For this setup we run our fingerprinting technique under three
setting: baseline, obfuscation and quantization. We merge our lab and public
dataset with the data collected from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (i.e., merged
dataset that we use in Chapter 5). For each setting we then evaluate F-score
for both random forest and k -NN (with LDML). Table 7.6 shows our results
for devices with at least 3 training samples (there are 545 such devices).
We can see that both countermeasure schemes significantly reduce the F-
score with obfuscation performing slightly better than quantization. Next, we
see how the countermeasure schemes react to different numbers of devices. To
evaluate this we first model intra- and inter-device distances for both obfus-
cated and quantized datasets. We adopt techniques similar to Section 5.5.2
where we derive parametric distributions to model intra- and inter-device
distances. We then use our proposed k-NN simulator (Algorithm 2) to pre-
dict classification accuracy for large pool of devices. Figure 7.16 highlights
our findings. We only evaluate accuracy for k = 1 as this was shown to have
the best overlap with real world results (see Section 5.5.3 for more details).
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We also plot the corresponding real world results for a k-NN classifier. We
see that irrespective of the device number classification accuracy reduces sig-
nificantly under both countermeasure schemes. And the estimated accuracy
reduces to almost zero for any number of devices greater than 1000. These
results indicate that simple countermeasures can thwart device fingerprinting
significantly.
Table 7.6: Comparing obfuscation and quantization with baseline for 545
devices.
Scheme
Avg. F-score(%)
k -NN with LDML Random Forest
Baseline 50 78
Quantization 17 32
Obfuscation 7 26
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Figure 7.16: Comparing large-scale classification accuracy for obfuscation
and quantization.
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7.6 Large-Scale User Study of Privacy vs. Utility
The above countermeasures degrade the readings from the motion sensors
somewhat and we wanted to better understand the impact of the counter-
measures on the utility of the sensors to web applications, specially user-
interactive applications. Of course, motion sensors have a wide range of uses,
from simple orientation detection to activity classification, step counting, and
other health metrics. Many of these, however, are deployed in application
form, whereas we wanted to focus on the threat of fingerprinting by web
pages. We performed a survey of web pages to identify how motions sen-
sors are actually used. We found that one of the most common application
of motion sensors was to detect orientation change in order to adjust page
layout (see Section 6.3.2 for more detail); such a drastic change in the grav-
ity vector will be minimally impacted by countermeasures. We did, however,
find several instances where web pages used the motion sensors as a means of
gesture recognition in the form of tilt-based input controlling a video game.
To study the impact of countermeasures on the utility of such tilt-based
controls, we carried out a user study where participants were asked to play
a game using tilt control while we applied privacy countermeasures to their
motion sensor data. We then evaluated the impact of the countermeasures
through both objective metrics of in-game performance, as well as subjective
ratings given by the participants. Our study was approved by our institu-
tional research board (IRB).
7.6.1 Study Design
After receiving some information about the study, our participants were in-
vited to play a game using their personal smartphone (Figure 7.17(a)).4 The
objective of the game is to roll a ball to its destination through a maze, while
avoiding traps (hitting a trap restarts the level from the beginning). The
game had five levels, which the participants played in order of increasing dif-
ficulty. Each level was played three times with different privacy countermea-
sures applied: baseline (no countermeasures), obfuscation, and quantization.
The order of countermeasure settings was randomized for each participant
and for each level, and not revealed to the participants. After completing
4https://web.engr.illinois.edu/∼das17/PrivacyVsUtility.html
111
a level three times, the participants were asked to rate each of the three
settings in terms of difficulty of controlling the game on a scale of 1 to 5 (
1 meaning ‘very easy’ whereas 5 referred to ‘very hard’). Participants also
were invited to provide free-form feedback (Figure 7.17(c)). Their ratings
and feedback, along with the settings and metrics regarding the time spent
on each game, and the number of times the game was restarted due to traps,
were then sent to our server for analysis.
(a) Instruction page (b) Level 1 (c) Feedback form (d) Next Level form
(e) Level 2 (f) Level 3 (g) Level 4 (h) Level 5
Figure 7.17: Game interface. The object is to roll the ball to the flag
while avoiding traps by tilting the smartphone. The user is then asked for
feedback about the relative difficulty of each level using different privacy
settings.
After completing a level, a user is invited to play the next level. Users were
required to play levels in order of increasing difficulty, but participants were
allowed to replay previous levels. We identified such repeat plays by setting
a cookie in a user’s browser and discarded repeat plays in our analysis.
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7.6.2 Study Results
We recruited users through institutional mailing lists, social media, as well as
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. We collected data from 201 users via Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk and 206 users that were recruited through other means over
a period of one month, for a total of 407 users (covering 144 different device
models as shown in Appendix C); several users’ data had to be discarded due
to irregularities in data collection. Note that not all users played through all
five levels, as shown in Table 7.7. Note that Mechanical Turk users had to
complete five levels to receive their reward, but in some cases we were not
able to receive some of their data due to network congestion at our server.
Table 7.7: Number of users that completed the first n levels recruited
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and other means.
Levels
MTurk non-MTurk Total
completed
1 0 26 26
1–2 1 14 15
1–3 0 34 34
1–4 91 67 158
1–5 107 63 170
Total 199 204 403
We found that, when considering the entire dataset, the choice of privacy
protection method did not significantly influence the subjective ratings as-
signed to the level (χ2 test, p = 0.34) nor the objective metrics of the game
duration (pairwise t-tests, p = 0.10 and 0.75 comparing baseline to obfusca-
tion and quantization, respectively) or the number of restarts due to traps
(pairwise t-tests, p = 0.11 and 0.47). However, as expected, all difficulty
metrics were significantly impacted by which level the person was playing,
as shown in Figure 7.18.
Furthermore, we observed a significant training effect between the first and
second time a user played the level (each level is played a total of 3 times
using different privacy methods), as seen in Figure 7.19. Interestingly, this
was not reflected in the subjective ratings (as verified by a χ2 test for each
level), suggesting that participants corrected for the training effect during
their reporting. There was a smaller training effect between the second and
third time a level was played; the improved performance was statistically
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Figure 7.18: Subjective and objective difficulty metrics increase across
game levels. Box plots show the median (horizontal line) and the
interquartile range (box), while whiskers show the range between the 5th
and 95th percentile, with the outliers being individually represented. The
notch in the box denotes the 95% confidence interval around the median.
significant only for durations of levels 4 and 5 and for the number of restarts
on level 5; which makes sense given the difficulty of these levels.
We therefore compared the difficulty of metrics for different privacy meth-
ods across only the second and third attempts at a level, discarding the first
attempt as training. We show the results for all levels in Figure 7.20. Signif-
icance tests fail to detect any differences between the difficulty metrics when
privacy methods are applied on any level.5
7.6.3 Limitations
Although the study failed to detect a significant impact of privacy methods
on utility, it does not definitively show that no impact exists—failure to reject
5The raw p-value comparing the number of restarts on level 5 between baseline and
obfuscated case is 0.025 but note that this is not significant at a p < 0.05 level after the
Bonferroni correction is applied.
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Figure 7.19: Game durations and number of restarts, as each level is
played three times. A large training effect is observed between the first and
second attempt, with a smaller effect between the second and third.
a null hypothesis does not demonstrate that the null hypothesis is true. In
particular, given the large variance in game performance across users, as seen
in, e.g., Figure 7.18, we would like to compare how different privacy methods
change a single user’s performance; however, given the low impact of privacy
protection we have observed so far, we would need to modify our study to
reduce or eliminate the training effect. Additionally, we tested our privacy
methods in a short game, and perhaps in games with a longer duration
some effects would materialize. However, we feel our results are promising
in showing that users may not have to lose much utility to employ privacy
protection methods.
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Figure 7.20: Impact of privacy method on subjective and objective
ratings, when considering second and third attempts only. Shown are the
histogram of subjective ratings and CDFs of game durations and number of
restarts for all 5 levels. No significant difference found in any of the metrics.
7.7 Summary
We evaluate the tradeoff between privacy and utility as realized by two differ-
ent fingerprinting mitigation strategies. While many applications of sensor
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data are unlikely to be affected, our user study shows that even for sensitive
applications that use motion sensors as control input, there is no significant
impact of privacy mitigation techniques on the usability of motion sensors in
this context, according to both subjective and objective metrics.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
The widespread adoption of smartphone and their increased computing ca-
pabilities are creating new threats for user privacy. As a result, we are in the
middle of a war over user privacy on the web. While users are slowly becom-
ing more concern about their privacy on smartphones, there are still may
issues which have not been well studied and hence not well known to general
users. In this dissertation we show that onboard sensors such as microphone,
accelerometer and gyroscope can be exploited as side-channels to uniquely
fingerprint smartphones. Fingerprinting smartphones enable publishers to
track users across multiple applications or websites. Publishers can then sell
this behavioral information to the ad networks. To make things worse some
of these sensors such as accelerometer and gyroscope can be accessed surrep-
titiously without any explicit user permission, so a user might not even be
aware of such fingerprinting mechanism.
In this dissertation we first look at how onboard acoustic hardware such
as microphones and speakers can be used to track smartphones. Microphone
and speaker are fundamental components present in any smartphone, thus
fingerprinting smartphones through microphones and speakers creates a se-
rious privacy concern for users. We found that the manufacturing imperfec-
tions of microphones and speakers are substantial and prevalent enough that
we can reliably track phones by looking at the spectral properties of the trans-
mitted and/or recorded audio signals. Surprisingly, you only need to extract
a few spectral features from the audio signal to track the device responsible
to generating and/or recording the audio signal. We found MFCCs as the
dominant features (at times the only set of features) required to uniquely
fingerprint smartphones. With 50 smartphones we were able to uniquely fin-
gerprint them with an average F-score of 98%. We also show the feasibility
of our approach even in the presence of ambient background noise. Our re-
sults indicate that fingerprinting smartphones through onboard microphone
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and speaker is a privacy concern and as a word caution we would recom-
mend users to be careful about providing applications or websites access to
microphone.
We next investigate if motion sensors can also be exploited to generate a
unique fingerprint for the device. Interestingly, motion sensor data is consid-
ered less sensitive and as a result no explicit permission is required to access
the motion sensors such as accelerometer and gyroscope. HTML5 enables
websites to directly access motion sensors without the user even knowing
about it. We develop our own web page to collect sensor data from both
our lab phones and participants through institutional mass email and social
media. We then show that it is indeed possible to fingerprint smartphones by
exploiting the manufacturing imperfections of onboard motion sensors. Both
accelerometer and gyroscope can be used individually to fingerprint smart-
phones but we obtain the best result when we combine features from both
the accelerometer and gyroscope. We were able to fingerprint 93 devices with
an average F-score of 96% when devices were kept stationary on top of a flat
surface. We also show that we can obtain similar fingerprinting accuracy
even when the device is kept in the hand of the user while the user is sit-
ting down silently. Finally, we showcase that even though our fingerprinting
technique is influenced by various environmental factors such as temperature
and temporal wear and tear, we can still retain an F-score of greater than
75%.
Given that we were able to showcase that motion sensor fingerprinting is
feasible with around 100 devices, we next extend our data collection process
to gather data from a total of 610 devices; bulk of which comes from par-
ticipants recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. We then rerun our
fingerprinting technique over this large dataset and show that we can still
identify devices with an F-score of 86% with only 25 seconds (equivalent to
5 training samples) worth of motion sensor data from each device. To es-
timate accuracy with even a larger device population, we derive intra- and
inter-device distance distribution from this large dataset and use these distri-
butions to emulate k-NN classifier. A conservative estimation of classification
accuracy was found to be in the range of 10–16% with 100 000 devices. This
result suggests that motion sensors alone might not to sufficient to distinguish
users in large populations, but when combined with other browser-based fin-
gerprints they are likely to generate unique fingerprints even among large
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populations.
To get a better understanding of our websites access motion sensors we
conduct a large-scale measurement study where we analyze how many of the
top 100 000 Alexa websites access motion sensors. We found that around 1%
of these websites access motion sensor data. We also determine 8 broad use
cases for accessing motion sensor data; distressingly, most of the websites
accessing motion sensor data send such data to a third party website. This
raises suspicion as to how third party websites are utilizing sensor data.
Finally, we focus heavily on devising countermeasures against motion sen-
sor fingerprinting as such sensors can be accessed by applications and/or
websites without any user permission. We propose three major countermea-
sure schemes – sensor calibration, data obfuscation and sensor quantization.
We also explore different variations of data obfuscation. All of our coun-
termeasures are effective in reducing fingerprinting accuracy, however, some
countermeasures adversely impact the utility of the motion sensors. We found
that manually calibrating certain sensors like gyroscope was not feasible and
certain data obfuscation schemes require prior knowledge of the underlying
application to be effective. Through a simple ‘step counter’ application we
were able to showcase that basic data obfuscation and sensor quantization
were the most promising countermeasures that could be readily applied to
existing browsers. To showcase that these two countermeasures are benign to
applications that interactively use motion sensors, we conduct a large-scale
user study where users were asked to play a game by tilting their smartphone.
After analyzing both subjective and objective feedback from a total of 403
users we were able to show that our proposed privacy mitigation techniques
did not have any significant impact on the usability of motion sensors.
As a final statement we want to convey that as smartphones are becoming
more intelligent by employing more sensors, we should also become more
aware of their potential privacy risks. In this context, our work not only
provides foundation towards understanding the privacy risks of fingerprinting
smartphones through acoustic and motion sensors, but also provides simple
yet effective mitigations against some of these fingerprinting techniques that
can be readily adopted by web browsers today.
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APPENDIX A
FEATURE DISTRIBUTIONS FOR
MOTION SENSOR DATA
We collected motion sensor data from a total of 610 devices. This large
dataset enabled us to derive a distribution for each feature. Figure A.1 shows
the distributions for the top 12 features selected based on JMI criterion [127].
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Figure A.1: Distributions for the top 12 original features.
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Similarly, Figure A.2 shows the distributions for the top 12 (out of 100)
features after LDML transformation is performed on the original dataset.
Compared to the original untransformed features we can see that the top
features under LDML have a higher degree of variation and hence higher
entropy.
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Figure A.2: Distributions for the top 12 features selected based on JMI
criterion after LDML transformation is performed.
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APPENDIX B
DEVICE MODELS IN OUR DATASET
We collected sensor data from a total of 610 devices which covered 108 dif-
ferent make and models of devices. Figure B.1 shows the distribution of the
different device models. We can see that different models of iPhones comprise
around 47% of all devices.
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Figure B.1: Distribution of the different make and model of smartphones
that provided sensor data for our study.
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APPENDIX C
DEVICE MODELS IN OUR USER STUDY
In total 407 users participated in our user study covering 144 different device
models. Figure C.1 shows the distribution of the different device models that
participated. 41% of the devices were different models of iPhones.
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Figure C.1: Distribution of the different make and model of smartphones
that participated in our user study.
139
